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Summary 
The goal of this thesis is to investigate how different factors have an impact on the exchange 
rate between Norwegian kroner and euro during the inflation targeting regime. The thesis uses 
a study by Bjørnstad and Jansen (2007) named “The NOK/euro exchange rate after inflation 
targeting: The interest rate rules” as both a starting - and reference point throughout the paper. 
Bjørnstad and Jansen investigate how a monetary regime shift affects the exchange rate in a 
small open economy. Their focus is on Norway and their transition from a fixed exchange rate 
targeting regime to an inflation targeting regime.  
Several previous studies of exchange rate determination in an inflation targeting regime have 
been using data containing different monetary policy regimes. In this thesis it will be 
investigated if the same effects can be found using data containing an inflation targeting 
monetary regime only. The data used is a sub sample of the data sample made by Bjørnstad 
and Jansen, which solely contains inflation targeting monetary policy in the years from 2001 
to 2009. It will be looked into how the Bjørnstad and Jansen model, and later a new model, 
works on the sub sample. How these models perform during the financial crisis in 2008 and 
2009 is also a topic. 
The last large change in Norwegian monetary policy came in March 2001, when Norway 
adopted an inflation target. The monetary exchange rate regime Norway has today is a result 
of economic evolution and several reforms of the monetary systems over the last 100 years. 
Norway has gone from a fixed exchange rate against a silver standard in the end of the 19
th
 
century, to floating exchange rate with an inflation target in the beginning of the 21
st
 century. 
This transition has been influenced and dictated both by events happening in Norway and 
events happening with their trading partners. The development of the different Norwegian 
monetary regimes through history, as well as the events which made this happen, are briefly 
reviewed in the second section of this paper.  
There is a huge amount of different economic theories on the subject on exchange rate 
determination. In an effort to limit the extent of this thesis, the only theory mentioned here is 
the portfolio theory on exchange rate determination. That being said, portfolio theory is not 
considered to be the only functioning theory. The portfolio theory is chosen due to the data 
 VI 
 
sample at hand and for its simplicity on deregulated exchange markets. A brief outline of a 
simple portfolio model is included in this paper. 
There exist several empirical studies in the field of exchange rate determination. In this thesis 
a few of these studies are briefly discussed, among them the earlier mentioned study by 
Bjørnstad and Jansen. These empirical findings represent the results after trying to model 
exchange rate development on different monetary regimes. The model by Bjørnstad and 
Jansen has been replicated and its performance has been thoroughly explored on different sub 
samples. A quick out-of-sample forecasting competition between the model by Bjørnstad and 
Jansen and a Random Walk model has also been done. One finding is that the Bjørnstad and 
Jansen model experience great trouble when it comes to both explaining and forecasting the 
financial crisis.  
The model by Bjørnstad and Jansen also contain some positive qualities that deserve to be 
investigated further. In the light of this, a new model on exchange rate determination under an 
inflation targeting regime is established. A sub sample of the data set by Bjørnstad and Jansen 
which only contain the years from 2001 to 2009 has been used. In this paper it is found that 
the major explanatory factors in exchange rate determination is the interest rate differential 
between Norway and Europe, and in specific the interest rate development in Norway. 
 The new model, in similarity with the Bjørnstad and Jansen model, do not predict the 
financial crises. Thus, the conclusion to this problem is that the events that determined the 
exchange rate during the financial crisis are exceptional circumstances, which disturb the 
relationship between the variables.  
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1    Introduction 
In a globalized world, with trade between countries, exchange rates is a factor which attracts 
attention from governments, central banks and private investors. The choice of monetary 
policy regime will have an impact on the determination of the exchange rate and its 
development. Further, the exchange rate will affect both trade between countries and the 
viability of companies exposed to trade. 
Floating exchange rates, which Norway has today, is usually determined by supply and 
demand of currencies in the foreign exchange market. The question is which factors decides 
supply and demand? Even though there are multiple economic theories on this subject, few of 
them have actually been proven to have empirical evidence. This is considered to be an 
economic puzzle.  
The goal of this thesis is to investigate how different factors have an impact on the exchange 
rate between Norwegian kroner and euro. A study by Bjørnstad and Jansen (2007) is used as 
both a starting - and reference point throughout the paper. Bjørnstad and Jansen investigate 
how a monetary regime shift affects the exchange rate in a small open economy.  
Previous studies of exchange rate determination in Norway during an inflation targeting 
regime have been using data containing different monetary policy regimes. This paper 
investigates whether their results are in place when using data only containing an inflation 
targeting monetary regime. The focus in this study is on the NOK/euro exchange rate. 
Norway has only had an inflation target since 2001, which makes the dataset, containing 
quarterly data from this period, somewhat limited. Anyhow, a very important virtue of the 
model made on this data, is that none of the misspecification tests are significant, such that 
inference about the variables based on the t-values and F-statistics can be made. 
When the financial crisis exploded in 2008, a critique against the economists was that they 
had not seen it coming. This paper also investigates whether the empirical models were able 
to predict or explain the events happening to the exchange rates during this period. 
The paper is organized as follows: In chapter 2, a quick summary of the development of the 
different Norwegian monetary regimes through history are given. Chapter 3 gives a brief 
outline of a simple portfolio model, which is used as theoretical base in this paper. Some 
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empirical results that both support and contradict the theory are presented in chapter 4. These 
empirical findings represent the results after trying to model exchange rate development on 
different monetary regimes. For the time being, none of these have tried to focus only on 
inflation targeting monetary regimes. As a result of this, a model solely based on data from an 
inflation targeting regime is made in chapter 5. This chapter also investigates how this model 
among others explains the financial crisis which hit the world financial markets in 2008 and 
2009. Chapter 6 concludes.  
All the econometric programming and analysis, including tables and figures, have been done 
using the econometric software OxMetrics 6 and PcGive 13. 
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2    Monetary Regimes in Norway since 
the 19
th
 Century. 
The monetary exchange rate regime that Norway has today is the result of economic evolution 
and several reforms of the monetary systems over the last 100 years. A short summary of the 
development since the end of the 19
th
 century is included as a background to the analytical 
parts of this thesis.   
From the 1850’s Norway had a silver standard, which later was changed for a gold standard in 
1873. The silver and gold standard required the Norwegian central bank to exchange the 
Kroner against gold at an official price. This system was in operation until the start of the 
First World War in August 1914, when Norges Bank (The Norwegian central bank) gave up 
the required exchange against gold. There was a rush on banks as people tried to exchange 
money for gold. Because of this massive demand for gold exchange, the central bank could no 
longer honor its obligations and were forced to give up the gold standard. Formally, the 
Norwegian Krone was still fixed to gold, but the price of the Krone against foreign currency 
was no longer dictated by the value of gold. According to Mestad (2002), we characterize the 
regime from 1914 and forward as a floating exchange regime. 
In the 1920’s Norway tried to get back to the gold standard at the same exchange rate value as 
before the war (the so called “paripolitikk”). In a determined attempt to reach this goal, 
Norway ran deflationary politics to get the value of the krone up. This policy was 
controversial and led to political debates and criticism from monetary circles. Despite 
skepticism, the revaluation policy was pushed through, and in April 1928 Norway was back 
on the gold standard (Mestad (2000)). 
The big crack on the New York stock exchange in the autumn of 1929 was the beginning of 
the Great Depression in the 1930s. This caused a financial crisis not only in the US, but also 
in Germany, England and other European countries. In September 1931 England had to 
abandon its gold standard, and only a few days later Norway did the same. This resulted in a 
two year period with floating exchange rates in Norway. 
The Norwegian government fixed the Krone to the British pound at a rate of 19.90 Kroner per 
pound in august 1933, in an effort to achieve price stability. At the same time, the central 
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bank obtained tight control over all foreign currency transactions. When the Second World 
War began in 1939, Norway switched the peg to the US Dollar, which was still connected to 
the gold (Mestad (2002)). During the war special actions were set into place and Norway 
experienced strict capital controls, cf. (Klovland (2004)). 
After the Second World War, the Norwegian exchange rate was mainly decided through 
international agreements. The Bretton Woods agreement, made in 1944, was a new 
international system of fixed exchange rates. Countries pegged their currency to the US 
Dollar, and the Dollar was convertible to gold at a fixed price. The US Dollar was chosen 
because of USA’s leading role in the world economy, and American monetary policy became 
a benchmark for interest rate and inflation development for the rest of the countries in the 
agreement. The Norwegian Krone was set to a fixed rate of 4.03 Kroner/dollar and 20 
kroner/British pound. Maximal deviation from the fixed rate was one percent
1
. However, the 
first devaluation happened already in 1949. England was no longer able to hold the fixed rate 
to the dollar and a devaluation of 30.5% took place. Norway devaluated shortly after (Mestad 
(2002)).  
The agreement worked well in the 1950s and 1960s. In the end of the 1960’s the US had 
trouble holding the dollar at the fixed price, because of high inflation and big deficits in their 
current account due to the Vietnam War. This resulted in a massive wave of speculation and 
the system broke down in 1971, (Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2005, p.803), Norges bank 
(2004)). 
After the breakdown of the Bretton woods agreement Norway had floating exchange rates in a 
short period of 5 months. This ended in December 1971 when Norway entered the 
Smithsonian agreement, which was the descendant of the Bretton woods system. The gold-
dollar relationship was removed and all the member countries agreed upon bilateral exchange 
rates with a fluctuation band of ±2.25 per cent. The European Economic Community made 
their own agreement in addition, with half the fluctuation band in the Smithsonian agreement. 
The Norwegian authorities, who thought the wide fluctuation band in the Smithsonian 
agreement made the currency connections too unstable, joined the EEC agreement in 1972 
(see Mestad 2002). The system was called “the snake in the tunnel” because of the smaller 
fluctuation band inside the wider Smithsonian band. 
                                                 
1
 http://www.norges-bank.no/templates/article____12107.aspx. 
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The Smithsonian agreement broke down in 1973, since neither England nor the US was able 
to keep the exchange rates that they had agreed upon.  As a result of the breakdown, the 
largest currencies (Dollar, Pound, Yen and the German mark) went floating. The rest of the 
European countries in the agreement kept their bilateral rates, fixed to the currencies in the 
snake and floating to the ones outside; cf. Norges bank (2004). 
After several devaluations of the Kroner, Norway left the agreement in December 1978 and 
introduced a currency basket, because the currency snake developed to become a part of the 
European Monetary System. The currency basket was trade weighted, according to the size of 
each country’s trade. Shifting of the weights in the currency basket resulted in multiple 
effective devaluations during this period, (Mestad (2002)). 
In 1990 the Krone was fixed against the European currency unit (ECU). The ECU was a 
basket of the currencies in the European Community, and it was only used as an account unit 
until it was replaced by the Euro in 1999
2
. The change of the peg was an effort by the 
Norwegian government to get a closer connection to the European monetary system, which 
was established in 1979. The Norwegian interest rate was tightly connected to the European 
interest rate, due to high capital mobility and the fixed exchange rate (see chapter 3.4). 
 When the European currency crisis hit in 1992, the European interest rate, and therefore also 
the Norwegian interest rate, increased dramatically. There was a widespread belief among 
investors in the market for foreign exchange that the interest rate was at a higher level than the 
Norwegian economy could cope with. This led to massive speculations against the Norwegian 
Krone. The Norwegian Central Bank fought against the speculations with even higher interest 
rate in an effort to stop the speculations. At December 10th 1992 the central abandoned the 
fixed exchange rate (see Gjedrem (1999)) and the Krone was free to float. In a message to the 
International Monetary Fund, Norges Bank wrote: 
“When the krone was linked to the ECU in the autumn of 1990, the central bank 
emphasized that in so doing we pegged the value of the Norwegian krone to the 
currencies of a group of countries whose long-term objective is to stabilize prices. 
Circumstances beyond our control have forced on Norwegian authorities the decision 
                                                 
2
 http://www.europaveien.no/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=267&Itemid=191 
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to allow the krone to float. However, the main objective of monetary and exchange 
policy is still to maintain price and cost growth at the prevailing level” 3 
Other European countries experienced the same, and let their currency float (e.g. Swedish 
Krone, British pound and Italian Lire) during 1992 (See chapter 3.4.2).   
The floating exchange rate regime was continued and the international value of the Krone was 
based on the exchange rates in the currency market. In 1994, the goal of monetary policy was 
to contribute to low and stable increases in prices and costs. To achieve this, a target of a 
stable exchange rate against the European currencies (the ECU and later the EURO) was 
implemented. The central bank could intervene in the currency market to keep the Norwegian 
currency stable and Norway thus had a “dirty” float regime during this period (Bjørnstad and 
Jansen (2007))  
The exchange rate was fairly stable until the triple crisis hit in 1998 (the Asian, Russian and 
South American) and the Norwegian Krone experienced big fluctuations and deflationary 
pressure (cf  Bjørnstad and Jansen (2007)). As a result, the Norwegian central bank had to use 
the interest rate actively. The sight deposit rate was as high as 10% in 1998. This reduced the 
pressure, and in 1999 the interest rates was lowered to more normal levels.  
In March 2001, a new target in the floating exchange rate regime was finally introduced. The 
monetary policy now became directed towards low and stable inflation. The goal was stable 
inflation on 2.5 percent over time. To achieve this, the interest rate should be used. The 
exchange rate could fluctuate according to the supply and demand in the currency market and 
it was free to float without interventions from the central bank. 
From May 2000 to January 2003, the Krone appreciated considerably. Many reasons for this 
have been mentioned  in the literature, but the dominating ones are increased interest rates 
relative to other countries, increased oil price, huge surpluses on the current account and the 
Krones status as a safe haven during unrest in the Middle-East, (Naug (2003), Bjørnstad and 
Jansen (2007), NOU (2003, no13)). All these reasons will be investigated in the following 
chapters. After a correction from 2003 to 2005, the exchange rate has been floating around 8-
8.25 Kroner per euro until the financial crisis hit in 2008 and the Krone depreciated sharply. 
                                                 
3
 Rundskriv 1/12 jan. 1993 (from Mestad 2002) 
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Figure 1 shows how the incidences in the history have affected the exchange rate. All major 
happenings have had an impact on the exchange rate, and led to either appreciation or 
depreciation. 
 
Figure 1 NOK/Euro exchange rate after 1983
4
 
 
After the inflation target in 2001, the interest rate has experienced more variation than usual. 
This is not uncommon because of the new floating exchange regime. The core of this thesis is 
to investigate what may lie behind this variation.  
 
 
                                                 
4
 Kilde: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fin/dok/nouer/2003/nou-2003-13/7.html?id=370327, Holden 
2002(http://folk.uio.no/sholden/Norske-valutakursregimer.doc), dataset. 
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3   Theoretical Framework: A Simple 
Portfolio Model 
The portfolio model is a dynamic model of exchange rate determination. The equilibrium in 
the model is determined by current account balance between the sectors. The sectors are home 
and foreign private investors, who want to differentiate their asset portfolios, and the central 
bank.  
 
3.1 The Market 
The exchange rate is determined by supply and demand in the foreign exchange market. The 
supply for foreign currency is determined by the net supply of foreign currency by the 
domestic and foreign general public. The demand for foreign exchange is determined by the 
central bank. The public acts as price takers since their transactions are usually too small to 
affect the price. The central bank can make large interventions in the foreign exchange 
market, and thus, they can be large enough to influence the price on foreign exchange. 
In the following I use the Norwegian Krone (NOK) as the domestic currency and Euro as the 
foreign currency. The exchange rate is the price of one unit of Euro in Norwegian Kroner.  
 
Figure 2 , Supply and demand in the foreign exchange market 
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In a fixed exchange rate regime, the exchange rate is predetermined, and thus exogenous, at a 
fixed level E. This implies that the central bank is committed to exchange the NOK for Euro 
at a given rate. If the supply of foreign currency for some reason should increase (S’), the 
central bank will have to buy the excess supply and increase its foreign exchange reserves 
(𝐹𝑔
′ ) in an effort to keep the exchange rate at the fixed rate.  
In a credible floating exchange rate regime, the central bank does not take any action if the 
supply of foreign currency should increase. The result of an increased supply of foreign 
currency is an appreciation of the NOK to a new level (𝐸′ ). 
 
3.2 The Building Blocks of the Portfolio Choice 
Model. 
I follow Rødseth (2009, Ch 1) and assume that the foreign exchange marked consists of three 
different sectors, which all can have both euro and NOK assets. The sectors are the 
government, which includes the central bank, the private and the foreign sector. All sectors 
can either borrow or lend in both currencies. One of the assumptions of the portfolio model is 
that it compares a small economy to the world, where the world is simplified to one country. 
In my example Norway is the small open economy and Europe is the other.  It is important to 
notice that the net demands for all the sectors summarize to zero. The domestic public debts 
have to be equal the government and foreign claims, or the other way around. 
Table 1
5
, Net financial assets, by sector 
Assets Govern. Private Foreign Total 
Kroner 𝐵𝑔  𝐵𝑃 𝐵
∗ 0 
Euros 𝐹𝑔  𝐹𝑃  𝐹
∗ 0 
Total 𝐵𝑔 + 𝐸𝐹𝑔  𝐵𝑃 + 𝐸𝐹𝑃 𝐵
∗ + 𝐸𝐹∗ 0 
 
𝐵𝑖 = Net kroner assets of sector i,  i= p, b,* 
𝐹𝑖 = Net euro assets of sector i 
𝐹𝑔 = Central Banks foreign exchange reserves or Government foreign currency debt 
 
                                                 
5
 Table 1,1 in Rødseth 2000. Rødseth uses Dollars as the foreign currency, while I use Euro. 
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The private domestic and foreign market participants will be interested in investing where the 
expected return on their investments is highest. The rate of return for domestic residents on 
NOK assets is the interest rate i. The rate of return on their foreign assets is 𝑖∗ + 𝑒 , where e is 
the rate of depreciation
6
. The investors get an extra return on their euro investment if the euro 
increases in value relative to the NOK , that is the NOK depreciates. If 𝑖 < 𝑖∗ + 𝑒, the highest 
returns are given on euro investments, and opposite if 𝑖 > 𝑖∗ + 𝑒. If 𝑖 > 𝑖∗ + 𝑒, you may gain 
by lending money in Europe and invest in NOK.  However, no one knows exactly what the 
rate of depreciation will be. Instead investors have to base their decision on the expected rate 
of depreciation (𝑒𝑒). 
If there does not exist any trade barriers on international capital movements (e.g. taxes, 
transaction costs), all investors have the same expectations and base their decisions only on 
expected returns, then we have perfect capital mobility between currencies. In this case, if 
𝑖 < 𝑖∗ + 𝑒𝑒 , everybody wants to borrow NOK and invest in euro, meaning that nobody wants 
to buy NOK. The only way to ensure both borrowing and lending in both currencies is if 
𝑖 =  𝑖∗ + 𝑒𝑒  
This condition is called the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), and it is the cornerstone 
parity condition for foreign exchange market efficiency. It assumes that the foreign exchange 
market participants are endowed with rational expectations and are risk neutral (Sarno 2005). 
The UIP condition is a long run parity condition and has to hold under perfect capital 
mobility. 
Usually the conditions for perfect capital mobility are too strong, and we then have what is 
called imperfect capital mobility. This means that investors may have both currencies in their 
portfolio, even though the UIP condition does not hold. According to Rødseth (2000, p.16) 
there are four main reasons why perfect capital mobility can be hard to achieve. 
 Exchange rate risk and risk aversion. Risk averse investors may be willing to give up 
some of the expected returns in order to reduce the risk because of the uncertain 
depreciation rate. In this case, the investors will keep some of their wealth in risk free 
NOK assets and some in euro. 
                                                 
6
 e= Ė/E, where a dot over the variable is its derivative with respect to time (Rødseth 2000). 
 11 
 
 Differing expectations. Because of the uncertainty about the rate of depreciation, 
people will have different expectations about the returns on the investments in foreign 
currencies. This implies that some will believe that NOK investments will give highest 
returns and vice versa. Furthermore, it gives people a possibility to lend and borrow 
from each other. 
 Transaction costs and liquidity. Changing money comes with a cost. Fees for 
exchange may result in less currency transactions and people withdrawing from the 
market. People also need money for transaction purposes, which means that they will 
hold money, even though the expected returns may be higher somewhere else. 
 Exchange controls. The government may have regulation on the supply of foreign 
exchange currency. There are several ways to regulate this, by quantitative limits on 
the investments, prohibit certain groups from the market or other ways. 
Under imperfect capital mobility, where the foreign exchange market participants for instance 
are risk averse, the UIP condition may include a risk premium (r). This is because agents 
demand a higher rate of return than the interest rate differential in return of holding currencies 
considered to be risky, see Sarno( 2005) and Alendal (2010). The risk premium is defined as: 
 
𝑟 = 𝑖 − 𝑖∗ − 𝑒𝑒      or     𝑖 = 𝑟 + 𝑖
∗ + 𝑒𝑒  
The risk premium is the difference between the expected return on NOK assets and expected 
return on euro assets. Compared to euro, NOK is considered being a risky asset. Thus, the 
expected return on NOK has to be r units higher than the expected return on foreign currency 
(𝑖∗ + 𝑒𝑒) for investors to invest in NOK.  The higher the risk premium, the more the investors 
are willing to invest in NOK. Notice that when the risk premium is zero the risk premium is 
reduced to the UIP condition (𝑖 = 𝑖∗ + 𝑒𝑒).  
 
The domestic investors want to divide their real wealth on domestic and foreign assets. Initial 
assets  has a subscript 0. 
𝑊𝑝 =
𝐵𝑝0 + 𝐸𝐹𝑝0
𝑃
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 A main assumption of the model is that the demand for foreign asset investment is decided 
by the initial wealth and the risk premium.  
𝐸𝐹𝑃
𝑝
= 𝑓 𝑟,𝑊𝑝  
The assumptions about the derivatives of the f-function are important: The higher the risk 
premium on the domestic currency, the more investors will shift the portfolio from foreign to 
domestic currency (𝑓𝑟 < 0) and an increase in wealth will be invested in both currencies 
(0 < 𝑓𝑊 < 1) (Rødseth (2000)). 
 
The domestic asset investment demand is decided by the rest of the wealth, after the foreign 
investments are subtracted. The excess wealth, which is not used on foreign investments, is 
invested at home. 
𝐵𝑝
𝑃
= 𝑊𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑟,𝑊𝑝) 
 
The same principles apply to the foreign investors. Note that the mirror image applies to 
foreigners, NOK assets are the foreign assets, while euro assets are the domestic assets.  
 
Wealth is divided between home and foreign assets
7
.  
𝑊∗ =
𝐵0
∗
𝐸
+ 𝐹0
∗
𝑃∗
 
 
The demand for foreign assets (NOK assets) depends on the wealth and the risk premium. 
𝐵∗
𝐸𝑃∗
= 𝑏(𝑟,𝑊∗) 
 
The rest of their wealth is used on domestic assets (euro assets) 
𝐹∗
𝑃∗
= 𝑊∗ − 𝑏(𝑟,𝑊∗) 
𝑏𝑟 > 0, 0 < 𝑏𝑊∗ < 1 
                                                 
7
 To avoid confusion in the rest of the thesis, a different type of subscript is used compared to Rødseth (2000).  
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The assumptions on the derivative of the b-function are the mirror image of the domestic f-
function. The higher the risk premium on the foreign currency (on NOK), the more foreign 
investors will shift their portfolio from euro assets to NOK assets (𝑏𝑟 > 0). An increase in 
wealth will be invested in both currencies (0 < 𝑏𝑊∗ < 1). 
 
The degree of diversification in the portfolio depends on the investor’s degree of risk 
aversion. A highly risk averse investor will demand a higher risk premium on risky assets 
than less risk averse investors. In this model the degree of risk aversion will be reflected by 
the properties of the b-and f-function
8
, in particular the derivatives with respect to the risk 
premium.  I assume that both the domestic and foreign investors have the same degree of risk 
aversion. 
 
3.3 The Model9. 
The portfolio model of the market for foreign exchange is a system of equations which is 
made up by the relationship in section 3.2, as well as assumptions about the exogeniety or 
endogeniety of for example the nominal exchange rate. This implies that the different ways of 
“determining the model” corresponds to different monetary policy regimes. 
A simple portfolio model consists of the following seven equations: 
1) 𝑊𝑝 =
𝐵𝑝0+𝐸𝐹𝑝0
𝑃
 
2) 𝑊∗ =
𝐵0
∗
𝐸
+𝐹0
∗
𝑃∗
 
3) 𝑟 = 𝑖 − 𝑖∗ − 𝑒𝑒  
4) 𝑒𝑒 = 𝑒𝑒 𝐸  
                                                 
8
 For more on different forms of b- and f-functions, see Rødseth (2000, chapter 2) 
9
 This is similar to equation 1.11 to 1.17 in Rødseth (2000, ch 1.4). The following builds directly on chapter 1 in 
Rødseth (2000). 
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5) 
𝐸𝐹𝑃
𝑃
= 𝑓 𝑟,𝑊𝑝  
6) 
𝐹∗
𝑃∗
= 𝑊∗ − 𝑏 𝑟,𝑊∗  
7) 𝐹𝑔 + 𝐹𝑝 + 𝐹
∗ = 0 
Equations 1 and 2 define the financial wealth as the value of initial stocks. Equation 3 is the 
risk premium. Equation 4 defines the expected depreciation and how it depends on today’s 
exchange rate. Equation 5 and 6 are the demand functions for foreign currency. Equation 7 is 
the equilibrium condition for the foreign exchange market. (Rødseth 2000) 
In this model there are seven endogenous variables; private wealth 𝑊𝑝 , foreign wealth 𝑊
∗, the 
private sectors euro assets 𝐹𝑝 , foreign euro assets 𝐹
∗, the risk premium r and the expected 
depreciation rate 𝑒𝑒 . Under a fixed exchange regime the foreign exchange reserves 𝐹𝑔  are also 
endogenous, while under a floating exchange regime the exchange rate E is endogenous. 
Under a float  𝐹𝑔  are kept exogenous, while E is exogenous during a fixed regime. The price 
levels (𝑃 and 𝑃∗) and interest rates (𝑖∗and 𝑖) are exogenous in both regimes. In addition, 𝐵𝑝0, 
𝐹𝑝0,𝐵0
∗ and 𝐹0
∗ are predetermined. 
Two additional assumptions of the model are that everybody has assets in both currencies in 
the initial period, and that not all capital gains are invested in foreign currency. 
3.3.1 The Supply of Foreign Exchange 
From equation 7 we see that supply and demand of foreign currency has to sum up to zero. 
The demand from the central bank (𝐹𝑔) has to equal the supply (𝐹𝑝 + 𝐹
∗ = 𝐹𝑠 = 𝐹𝑔) of 
foreign currency. If we first insert equation 7 into equation 5 and the result into equation 6, 
and later insert equation 1, 2, 3 and 4 we get the supply of foreign currency
10
. 
8) 𝐹𝑠 𝐸, 𝑖 − 𝑖∗ = −
𝑃
𝐸
𝑓  𝑖 − 𝑖∗ − 𝑒𝑒 𝐸 ,
𝐵𝑝0+𝐸𝐹𝑝0
𝑃
 − 𝑃∗[
𝐵0
∗
𝐸
+𝐹0
∗
𝑃∗
− 𝑏(𝑖 − 𝑖∗ − 𝑒𝑒 𝐸 ,
𝐵0
∗
𝐸
+𝐹0
∗
𝑃∗
)] 
The supply of foreign currency depends mostly on two factors: the interest rate differential 
and the exchange rate.  
                                                 
10
The relevant calculations are found in ”Attachment B” 
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The exchange rate enters the equation both through the expected depreciation and through the 
value of the existing stocks. Therefore, the exchange rate has two effects on the supply: a 
portfolio composition effect and an expectations effect. This can be seen by differentiating the 
supply function with respect to the exchange rate and find the slope of the supply curve. 
9) 
𝜕𝐹𝑠
𝜕𝐸
=
𝑃
𝐸2
  1− 𝑏𝑊∗ 
𝐵0
∗
𝑃
+  1− 𝑓𝑊𝑝  
𝐸𝐹𝑝0
𝑃
 −
𝑃
𝐸
𝑒𝑒
′ (
𝐸𝑃∗
𝑃
𝑏𝑟 − 𝑓𝑟) 
The effect on the supply curve of an increase in the exchange rate is positive only if a set of 
sufficient conditions are satisfied. These are 𝐹𝑝0 > 0,   𝐵0
∗ > 0,   𝑓𝑊 < 0,    𝑏𝑊∗ < 0, 𝑒𝑒
′ < 0. 
The derivatives implies that the private domestic sector has foreign asset holdings initially, 
that foreigners have NOK assets, a wealth increase will be used on both home and foreign 
assets, and that the expectations are regressive (more on regressive expectations below). If all 
this is satisfies, then the supply curve is increasing (more on this discussion see Rødseth 
(2000, p.21). 
The exchange rate effect on supply can be written more compactly as 
𝜕𝐹𝑠
𝜕𝐸
=
𝑃
𝐸2
𝛾 −
𝑃
𝐸
𝑒𝑒
′ 𝜇 
where 
 𝛾 =  1 − 𝑏𝑊∗ 
𝐵0
∗
𝑃
+  1 − 𝑓𝑊𝑝 
𝐸𝐹𝑝0
𝑃
  , and 𝜇 =
𝐸𝑃∗
𝑃
𝑏𝑟 − 𝑓𝑟 .  (𝑏𝑟 > 0,𝑓𝑟 < 0) 
γ is called the portfolio composition effect. When the exchange rate increases, all foreign 
assets will increase in value relative to domestic currency assets. The effect will change the 
value distribution of each sectors portfolio, and as a result they will rebalance their portfolios.  
The expectations effect is represented by -µ𝑒𝑒
′ . The degree of capital mobility is measured by 
𝜇. An increase in the degree of capital mobility will lead to bigger changes in the supply of 
foreign currency after interest rate changes, than in the case of a lower degree of capital 
mobility. High capital mobility will result in a flatter foreign currency supply curve relative to 
low capital mobility; see Figure 3. Under perfect capital mobility the supply curve will be 
completely horizontal. Another implication worth noticing is that changes in the central banks 
foreign currency fund will have a smaller impact on the exchange rate when capital mobility 
is high than when it is low. If capital mobility is perfect and the supply curve is horizontal, 
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interventions from the central bank will have no effect on the exchange rate. However, the 
simple portfolio model breaks down with perfect capital mobility. The risk premium equation 
is reduced to the UIP condition, and the demand equations for foreign exchange are not well 
defined. For completeness, we note therefore that in the case of perfect capital mobility, the 
system of equations (1)-(7) can be replaced by a single equation: 
10) 𝑖 = 𝑖∗ − 𝑒𝑒(𝐸) 
Since r = 0 by definition. 
 
 
Figure 3 supply curves with different capital mobility 
 
Depreciation may change expectations about future exchange rate changes (𝑒𝑒). This will 
change the risk premium, which has an impact on foreign currency demand. The sign on the 
expectations effect depends on the sign of the expectations. I will use regressive expectations 
(𝑒𝑒
′ < 0) as a reference case, which means that depreciation now lowers the expected future 
depreciation. We also have extrapolative expectations (𝑒𝑒
′ > 0), where a depreciation now 
increases expected future depreciation, and constant expectations (𝑒𝑒
′ = 0) where a 
depreciation now has no effect on expected future depreciations (Rødseth 2000). Regressive 
expectation has some empirical evidence, and the only way the expectations effect is positive 
is with regressive expectations (𝜇𝑒𝑒
′ < 0). 
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The effect of an interest rate change on the foreign currency supply can be found by 
differentiating the supply with respect to the interest rate.  
11)    
𝜕𝐹𝑔
𝜕𝑖
=  −
𝑃
𝐸
𝑓𝑟 + 𝑃
∗𝑏𝑟 =
𝑃
𝐸
 −𝑓𝑟 +
𝐸𝑃∗
𝑃
𝑏𝑟 =
𝑃
𝐸
𝜇 > 0 
Where  𝜇 still is the degree of capital mobility and is positive. 
We can see that this effect is positive, the supply of foreign currency increases when the 
domestic interest rate increases. When the domestic interest rate increases, investors want to 
sell some of their euro holdings and invest in NOK. This will increase the supply of foreign 
currency, as in Figure 2. The size of the effect of the increased supply depends on the degree 
of capital mobility between the two currencies.  
 
3.4 Fixed Exchange Rates 
Generally, the central bank has two instruments that affect the supply of foreign currency. It 
can either use the interest rate or the foreign currency reserves. When the exchange rate is 
fixed, the central bank looses one of its instruments in effort to keep the exchange rate fixed.  
The central bank can determine the level of the risk premium with the interest rate, to get the 
domestic money market in equilibrium through endogenous money supply. The risk premium 
is one of the factors which influence the behavior of the suppliers of foreign currency. If the 
central bank sets the domestic interest rate lower than the interest rate abroad, it will decrease 
the risk premium. Such a reduction in the risk premium will in turn reduce the supply of 
foreign currency and give an upwards pressure on the exchange rate, see Figure 2. To keep 
the exchange rate stable the central bank will have to use its foreign currency reserves to buy 
NOK. These changes in the foreign currency reserves can be large if capital mobility is high. 
As a worst case scenario, the central bank can run out of foreign currency. The central bank 
can borrow foreign currency to buy NOK. Still, there will be limits on how much the central 
bank can borrow in the short run. Irrespective of this, the central bank ends up as a borrower 
in the market with the highest expected return and a lender in the market with lowest. Thus, 
the result might be rather costly in the long run. Consequently, the easiest thing for the central 
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bank to do is to keep the interest rate tightly connected to the foreign interest rate in order to 
keep the risk premium stable. 
 
3.4.1 Speculation against Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes. 
Fixed exchange rate regimes can be vulnerable against currency speculations, even though 
there may not be any reason for devaluation in the real economy. The reason for this 
vulnerability is the possibility of speculation in enormous amounts against a currency with 
low risk, called “one-way bets”. “One way bets” has the opportunity to score huge gains at the 
risk of loosing very little. This is only possible if all the market participants agree about the 
way the currency should be moving, and there has to be someone to bet against, which is 
usually the central bank, (see Holden (2006)
11
). 
 When financial investors believe that some currency such as the NOK may soon be 
devaluated, they have got an incentive to borrow NOK in the bank, invest in for example 
euro, and exchange it back to NOK after an eventual devaluation. If the NOK has been 
devaluated it is possible to have huge gains. However, if the NOK has not, it has only led to a 
small transaction cost; see Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2005, p. 757). In the portfolio 
model, this expected devaluation will be the same as an increase in the expected depreciation 
rate 𝑒𝑒 in the risk premium equation. An increased 𝑒𝑒  will result in a decreased risk premium if 
interest rates were kept constant. A decrease in the risk premium may lead investors to shift 
their portfolio away from the domestic currency to the foreign currency. This will lead to a 
negative supply shock in figure 2.  
The central bank has two ways to react:  
1) It can sell foreign currency and buy domestic in an effort to keep the exchange rate stable. 
Without huge foreign currency reserves, there may be a risk of the central bank not being able 
to keep the exchange rate at the fixed level, and a devaluation may be the result.  
2) It can increase the domestic interest level in the same amount as the increase in 𝑒𝑒 . This 
will keep the risk premium unchanged. An unchanged risk premium will not give the 
                                                 
11
 http://folk.uio.no/sholden/E1310/ECON1310-H09-sh.html 
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investors any excuse to shift their portfolios. A higher interest rate can in addition fight of 
speculation because it will make it more expensive to borrow NOK, see Rødseth (2000). 
Unfortunately, the increase in the interest rate needed to compensate for the change in the 
expected depreciation rate can be huge. During the EMS currency crisis in 1992, Sweden had 
to increase their overnight lending rate to 500 per cent to fight off speculations against the 
Swedish Krone (Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2005)). Very high interest rates over long 
periods of time can seriously harm the economy and history shows that the central bank will 
often give up their peg rather than inflict huge costs on the economy. When there are high 
capital mobility and no exchange controls, it can be very hard for a small country acting alone 
to keep their currency fixed unless the central bank has credibility. For the central bank to 
keep of speculative pressure, the public needs to be fairly confident that their currency is not 
being devaluated. 
 
3.4.2 The EMS Crisis in 1992-93 
The European Monetary System was introduced in 1979 and the countries in the European 
Union had to commit to keep their bilateral exchange rates fluctuating only ±2.5% around the 
fixed exchange rate parities. Germany participated in the system, but would not let go of their 
monetary policy which was directed towards low and stable inflation. In this way, the rest of 
the EMS countries pegged their values to the German mark and had to coordinate their 
interest rate according to the German interest rate. As a result, all the other EMS countries 
experienced a lower and more stable inflation rate. The system worked well all the way to the 
1990s. Even Sweden, Norway and Finland decided to peg their currencies to the ECU in 
1990. However, the reunification of East and West Germany in late 1990 led to huge fiscal 
expansions, and the Bundesbank raised the interest rate to obstruct a boost in the inflation 
rate. The rest of the EMS had to increase their interest rates accordingly and entered a 
recession which deepened as Germany kept its interest rate up.  
In 1992 the international financial market participants started to doubt if the other EMS 
countries would stick to their peg, or devaluate their currency against the German mark in an 
effort to escape the recessions. In September 1992 violent speculative attacks against most of 
the EMU member countries started. Within a few days, Finland, Italy and the UK had to drop 
out of the EMS system and allow for floating currencies. Even though higher interest rates 
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were used to fight of the speculation, Sweden moved to floating exchange rates in November, 
with Norway joining them in December. In the summer of 1993 practically all the EMS 
member countries was under heavy speculative attacks, and in august 1993 the fluctuating 
bands was widened to ±15%. In practice, the new band meant giving up their fixed exchange 
rate system, see Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2005). 
 
3.5 Floating exchange rate 
The connection between home and foreign interest rates during fixed exchange rates can been 
seen in the light of what economists call the “Impossible Trinity”.  A macroeconomic policy 
regime can only achieve two out of the following three policy goals: A fixed exchange rate 
regime, free cross-border capital flows and an independent monetary policy. When there is 
perfect capital mobility and fixed exchange rate, the interest rate has to be equal to the foreign 
interest rate to keep the expected depreciation rate equal to zero, in accordance with the UIP 
condition. If a country wants to set its own interest rate independent of the foreign interest 
rate, it has to let its exchange rate vary given free capital mobility. Alternatively, a fixed 
exchange rate and free interest rates require strict capital controls. Thus, to achieve all three 
policy goals is in fact unfeasible.  
Usually, most countries choose to have free cross-border capital controls, to encourage 
economic growth and trade through easy access to capital. As a result, each country has to 
decide between two options: Dependent or independent monetary policy. When choosing 
independent monetary policy, it must also adopt floating exchange rates. The advantage with 
independent monetary policy is that the country can set interest rates according to need in the 
economy, which may give a stable economic environment. The benefit of fixed exchange 
rates and a dependent monetary policy regime is that it gives predictability for trade and 
stable prices. Which regime to choose depends on the valuation of the different pros and cons 
in question. 
 There are two main types of floating exchange rate regimes: clean float and dirty float. In a 
clean float regime, the exchange rate is not in any way influenced by the government or 
central bank. In a dirty float the central bank can buy foreign currency or sell domestic 
currency in an attempt to keep the exchange rate more stable.  
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The most usual type of target in a floating exchange rate regime is some kind of inflation 
target. They can either have a strict inflation target, where low and stable inflation is the only 
goal, or a more flexible inflation target, where the central bank can pursue other targets as 
long as the inflation is stable and close to the target. When a country has exchange rate 
targeting or money supply targeting, the central bank can react with its instruments 
immediately and see the reactions instantaneously. Hence, the central bank can keep the 
exchange rate or money supply within a band. By contrast, when the central bank has an 
inflation target, it can only influence the inflation rate in the periods ahead and only observe 
the inflation in previous periods. Thus, the central bank has to respond to the past to get the 
inflation back on target in the future. To keep the inflation at target at any time is impossible. 
The way the central bank reacts on changes in the inflation is by adjusting the interest rate. 
We see that an increase in the interest rate will appreciate the exchange rate (decrease E). 
How much a change in the interest rate affects the exchange rate depends on the capital 
mobility  𝜇 , the expectations (𝑒𝑒
′ ) and the portfolio composition effect (𝛾)12.  
𝑑𝐸
𝑑𝑖
= −
1
𝛾
𝜇𝐸 − 𝑒𝑒
′
< 0 
We know that the supply of foreign currency increases when the domestic interest rate rise 
(see equation 11). Thus, the effect on the exchange rate of an increase in the interest rate is 
stronger if the capital mobility (𝜇) is high, see Figure 3. The higher the level of |𝑒𝑒
′ |the smaller 
the effect of the interest rate will be. 
We can summarize the exchange rate as a function of supply of foreign currency, where 
supply is determined by the interest rate differential and the expected depreciation rate. 
𝐸 = 𝐸(𝑖, 𝑖∗, 𝑒𝑒) 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 For more details about the calculations, see Rødseth (2000) p.26. 
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3.6 The Medium and Long Run. 
The portfolio model is a stock model which is first and foremost relevant in the short run 
analysis. It has emphasis on changes that happens when investors reallocate their portfolios 
from day to day to achieve highest expected return. From day to day and in the short run 
factors like the interest rate deviation, devaluation- and depreciation expectations explain 
most of the change in the exchange rate (in a float regime).  
 However, since I look at quarterly data in the empirical part of the thesis, it is relevant to 
open up for other (”flow model”) variables as well.  
 
3.6.1 The Current Account in the Medium Run − the Flow 
Approach. 
The current account is the sum of balance of trade, net factor income and net transfer 
payments. Balance of trade is exports minus imports of goods and services. Factor income is 
interest rates and dividends, and transfer payments are foreign aid or other transfers to and 
from abroad.  
When a country has a surplus in the current account, it acquires foreign assets. As a result, 
domestic investors might rebalance their portfolios, such that both the supply of foreign assets 
and demand for NOK assets increase. Over time this will lead to an appreciation of the 
domestic currency under floating exchange regime, or to an increase in the foreign exchange 
reserves under a fixed exchange rate regime (see Figure 4).  
Norway is the fifth largest oil exporter in the world
13
, and in 2007 the oil producing sector 
stood for 24% of GDP. The export of oil and gas made up 43% of the total export in 2009 and 
are one of the main reasons why Norway has a huge trade surplus. This implies that the 
petroleum producing sector has a huge impact on the Norwegian economy. The oil producing 
companies has usually all their income in dollars or pound, but have to pay taxes in NOK. 
The petroleum tax consists of the ordinary corporation tax corresponding to 28 per cent of 
their profit and an additional tax, due to exceptional opportunities of making profit, on 50 per 
                                                 
13
 In 2008, http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/oed/tema/olje_og_gass.html?id=1003 
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cent.  This tax has to be paid every second month and consists of huge amounts. As a result, 
the oil producing companies will have to supply foreign currency to get NOK to pay for their 
taxes, see Romstad (2008). Both the current account surplus and the petroleum companies’ 
currency supply can give an upward pressure on the NOK. 
 
Figure 4 the effect over time of a current account surplus
14
. 
 
Norway’s revenue from the petroleum sector is invested abroad through the Government 
pension fund. This is done in order to have sustainable economic revenues from a temporary 
source of income and to avoid Dutch disease. If the domestic activity is largely dependent on 
petroleum revenues, there would be a tight connection between the oil price and the NOK 
exchange rate. The Government Petroleum Fund is there to make the domestic activity less 
contingent on the petroleum revenues. Thus, it is contributing to make the NOK exchange rate 
less dependent on oil price (Bernhardsen and Røisland (2000)). Such a conclusion is also 
supported by the findings in Bjørnstad and Jansen (2007). 
3.6.2 Expectations 
Equation 4 in the model defines the expected depreciation and how it only depends on today’s 
exchange rate. This is a major simplification. In practice, expectations are based not solely on 
the level of the exchange rate today, but also on many other factors which can affect the 
exchange rate, like real exchange rate, development in the world financial markets and prices 
of dominating goods. If we collect all the factors in Z, we have a new model of expectations:  
                                                 
14
 Figure 1.7 in Rødseth 2000. 
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𝑒𝑒 = 𝑒𝑒 𝐸,𝑍  
Where 𝑍 = 𝑕(𝜀,𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑙 ,𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡, 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠,… ) 
 The real exchange rate 𝜀.The real exchange rate is the relative price level between 
countries expressed in a common currency. 
𝜀 =
𝐸𝑃∗
𝑃
 
This converges towards a stable level in the long run, called steady state. If investors 
believe that the real exchange rate is higher now than its steady state level, they will 
expect the exchange rate to depreciate over time, such that the real exchange rate 
converges towards its steady state. Similarly, if there is a jump in foreign- or domestic 
price level, the exchange rate will correct the relationship so that the ε tends to its long 
run level. A high/low real exchange rate will then create expectations about a nominal 
change in the exchange rate. 
 World market. In the short run, happenings in the world and world financial markets 
can have huge impacts on the exchange rate. When the investment bank Lehman 
Brothers collapsed on September 15
th
 2008, the reaction in the world financial markets 
was an increased risk premium in the entire world (Gjedrem (2009)). This decreased 
the supply of foreign currency and the NOK depreciated. 
Upheavals in the world markets are often followed by great uncertainty in the foreign 
exchange markets and investors escape to big and safe currencies which are labeled as 
“safe havens”. Under the financial crisis, investors fled from small currencies, like the 
NOK, to big currencies like the dollar and euro. The “safe haven” currencies are often 
big and can withstand huge unrest in the capital markets without big fluctuations, 
compared to smaller currencies. This explains why smaller currencies usually are more 
volatile than the bigger “safe havens”.  Furthermore, ”safe haven” currencies can 
experience a negative risk premium, because investors are willing to “pay” (in the 
form of lost expected return) to hold the currency to avoid risk. Such insurance 
properties might be one of the reasons behind the great depreciation of the NOK/euro 
exchange rate in 2008. 
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In 2002 there was unrest in the Middle East. Investors wanted to secure themselves 
against the risk of a sharp increase in the oil price. Since the NOK was expected to be 
connected to the oil price and expected to appreciate when the oil price increased, the 
NOK was seen as a safe haven. The risk premium fell and the demand for NOK 
increased (Naug (2003)).  
 Dominating goods. If a country is a major exporter or importer of certain goods or raw 
materials, the price of these commodities may also affect the expectations about the 
exchange rate. A price change in these commodities may have an effect on the whole 
economy in the medium and long run (see discussion about current account surplus in 
previous subchapter). 
 Speculations see chapter 3.4.1. 
As a result, in practice, the nominal exchange rate is a function of interest rates and variables 
that affect the expectations: 
𝐸 = 𝐸(𝑖, 𝑖∗, 𝑒𝑒 ,𝑍,… ) 
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4     Empirical Results. 
4.1 Where do we stand? 
Even today in 2010, very few of the theoretical assertions made in theories of exchange rate 
determination have been proven to have an effect empirically. Some studies have found some 
evidence for the theoretical hypothesis about long-run relationships, but the empirical results 
on daily and monthly basis are very poor. For a more thorough discussion about this puzzle, 
see Sarno (2005) or Frankel and Rose (1995) 
”The international finance profession has not yet been able to produce theories and, as 
a consequence, empirical models which allow us to explain the behavior of exchange 
rates with a reasonable degree of accuracy.” (Sarno 2005) 
The legendary paper ”Empirical exchange rate models of the seventies: Do they fit out of 
sample” by Meese and Rogoff in 1983 compared models of exchange rate determination 
based on their out-of-sample forecasting and explanatory power. Their finding was that a 
simple Random Walk model outperformed all the other models as a predictor of exchange 
rates. Moreover, the models have not improved much since the seventies according to recent 
literature (Naug (2003), Sarno (2005), Frankel and Rose (1995)). 
 
4.1.1 Order flows 
In recent decades a new model based on microstructure theory has found place in the 
exchange rate theory. The new model is based on order flows, which are net currency 
transactions. If one participant buys 20 units of Norwegian Kroner, while another sells 15 
units, then the order flow volume equals 5 units. A positive amount leads to positive pressure 
in the market and the NOK may appreciate. A negative amount may lead to depreciation.  
The price of currency is determined through multiple steps. First the market participants 
observe and interpret information about macroeconomic fundamentals and set an order to the 
market makers. Next, the market makers in the exchange rate market can get access to the 
participants’ beliefs and information through the order flows. Thereafter, each of them set 
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their price in the light of this information. In such a way, information has a major role in order 
flow theory. The role of information determines the price through two channels: One direct, 
where news have a direct effect on the exchange rates, and one indirect, where the  
participants’ heterogeneous beliefs are included by the order flows. The order flow works as a 
mechanism, which gathers price relevant information like changes in expectations, the 
participants’ opinion about macroeconomic news and shocks that affect the demand in the 
market. In this way, order flows work as a proxy for the fundamentals and can be used to 
predict the exchange rate.  
The main findings are that there exists a strong connection between order flows and the daily 
exchange rate. It is also found that different customer segments have different impact on the 
exchange rate, because of different use of currency and beliefs about exchange rates. For 
more on order flows, see Romstad (2009) and Rime and Sojli (2006). 
 
4.2 Norwegian Macro Econometric Results 
My plan for the rest of this thesis is to explore NOK/Euro exchange rate determination in the 
medium to long run in this millennium. I will use the article by Bjørnstad and Jansen (2007) 
as a reference point for my analysis of an inflation targeting regime. Bjørnstad and Jansen 
tested how a transition from a regime with exchange rate targeting to a regime with inflation 
targeting affects the exchange rate determination in a small open economy. In the end of the 
chapter I will investigate how their model fit out of sample, compared to a Random Walk 
model. 
 
4.2.1 The Model in the Bjørnstad and Jansen Study 
The studies of Bjørnstad and Jansen (2007) follow an empirical investigation by Bjørnland 
and Hungnes (2006), who tested whether two long run parity conditions hold empirically 
using data on Norway and Europe. In addition to testing the UIP condition (𝑖 −  𝑖∗ = 𝑒𝑒) from 
the capital market, they tested the Purchasing Parity Condition (PPP). The PPP condition 
comes from the goods market and states that the national price levels should be equal when 
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expressed in a common currency, see Sarno (2005). Hence, the real exchange rate 𝜀 (see 
chapter 3.6.2) should be equal to one in the long run. The real exchange rate 𝜀 is: 
𝜀 =
𝐸𝑃∗
𝑃
= 1 ,    and in logs:    𝑙𝑛𝜀 = 𝑙𝑛𝐸 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃 + 𝑙𝑛𝑃∗ = 𝑣 − 𝑝 + 𝑝∗ = 0 
PPP is a parity condition that assumes no trade costs. Since trade is costly, the PPP condition 
does usually not hold at each point in time. In any case, the real exchange level can still bring 
information about the price level differences between countries over time. Thus, ε may be 
interpreted as a measure of the deviation from PPP, and it must be stationary for the long-run 
PPP to hold (Sarno 2005).  
The PPP condition and UIP condition are strongly related. Shocks can force the real exchange 
rate away from PPP, either by increased domestic- or foreign price levels or by the exchange 
rate. This shock may force the central bank to respond by a change in the interest rate, to keep 
the exchange rate fixed or inflation stable. The change in the interest rate differential may 
encourage massive movements in the capital flow, since the risk premium change. This can 
keep the exchange rate away from purchasing parity for long periods according to Bjørnland 
and Hungnes (2006). 
Bjørnland and Hungnes use data on the NOK/euro exchange rate from first quarter in 1983 to 
the second quarter in 2002. After testing they came up with a combined PPP and UIP 
equilibrium correction (ECM) model for the change in the NOK/euro exchange rate. 
Below I reproduce equation (9) in Bjørnstad and Jansen (2007): 
 
The variables are: The log of nominal NOK/euro exchange rate (v= lnE), Norwegian and euro 
zone (trade weighted) consumer prices (p and p*) and Norwegian and euro zone (trade 
weighted) 3-months money market interest rates (i and i*). All variables are in log and are 
lagged in different ways. Insignificant variables have been omitted from the equation. We see 
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that domestic inflation has a positive effect and foreign inflation has a negative effect on the 
exchange rate determination. The effect of domestic and euro zone interest rate changes have 
strong effects on the exchange rates.  
In the long run both the PPP and the UIP conditions converge towards a stationary level. We 
see that when the PPP condition does not hold, there is a correcting mechanism in the next 
period in an effort to keep the PPP at its steady state in the long run. The interest rate 
differential in the UIP condition has a similar impact on the next period exchange rate. When 
the interest rate differential increases, it will result in an increased rate of depreciation, which 
will result in lower exchange rate in the next periods. This is exactly what the UIP condition 
states. Similarly in the portfolio model, a higher domestic interest rate will increase the risk 
premium on the domestic currency. As a result, more investors will shift the portfolio from 
foreign to domestic currency. Thus a higher risk premium gives a lower exchange rate. 
All the short run price coefficients are larger than one, which may be consistent with 
overshooting. In the long run they will be one in absolute value, in accordance with long run 
PPP. A conspicuous and somewhat strange result is represented by the signs of the short run 
interest rate variables ∆𝑖𝑡  and ∆𝑖𝑡−2
∗ . Notice that when the domestic interest rate increases, it 
will lead to higher exchange rate and a depreciation of NOK. This is in conflict with what the 
portfolio model states. Bjørnland and Hungnes explain the apparent contradiction in the 
following paragraph: 
“Historically, Norges Bank has increased the interest rate when there have been a 
depreciating pressure, and reduced the interest rate when there was an appreciation 
pressure. An increase in the interest rate differential has therefore often coincided with 
a weaker exchange rate, while an interest rate increase may have prevented the 
exchange rate from falling even further” (Bjørnland and Hungnes (2003)). 
“In the long run, however, the exchange rate will eventually move towards 
equilibrium. The equilibrium correction terms have the expected sign, so that the 
exchange rate adjusts in the right direction” (Bjørnland and Hungnes (2006)). 
 
A critique against the study is that Bjørnland and Hungnes have not put much focus on the 
qualitative difference between the different monetary regimes that were operating during the 
sample period. Norway had fixed exchange rate regime until 1992, first against a trade 
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weighted currency basket, and from 1990 against the ECU. From 1992, Norway then changed 
to a floating exchange regime, first with an exchange rate target and from March 2001 
inflation target. 
 “Switching from a fixed exchange rate to a floating rate - which changes the way 
expectations are formed - changes the behavior of nominal and real exchange rates and 
the ability of the UIP to explain exchange rate changes.” (Quote by C. Neely and L. 
Sarno (2002) in Sarno (2005) 
Different monetary regimes may lead to different values of the variables in different points in 
time in the econometric analysis. Bjørnland and Hungnes have reported Chow statistics and 
constancy graphs, and concluded that there exist no such effects of the regime shifts. The 
reason may be that only the four last data points includes the new regime, giving it little effect 
on the rest of the data. Nevertheless, a central question remains: Would including the regime 
shifts give a better fit and short run interest rate effects with the expected sign?   
 
4.2.2 What Happened after the Monetary Policy Regime Change? 
As mentioned, the starting point of Bjørnstad and Jansen’s study is the model of Bjørnland 
and Hungnes (2006). The authors aimed to closer examine how the exchange rate equation 
responds to the regime shift in March 2001. They reasoned that in an exchange rate targeting 
regime interest rates are only used to stabilize large movements in the exchange rate, after the 
use of interventions have failed. When shifting to an inflation targeting regime the use of 
interest rates will change. Interest rates will now be used to regulate domestic demand to 
stabilize the inflation (Bjørnstad and Jansen (2007)). 
Bjørnstad and Jansen extend the dataset to include third quarter of 2006, and re-estimate the 
model. The original specification of the equation gets rejected, because the relationship 
between the variables breaks down after the regime shift. They also experienced significant 
forecast failure.  
As a result of this, Bjørnstad and Jansen came up with a new ECM model, including a set of 
new variables which could detect possible effects of the monetary policy regime shift. 
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This is the resulting regression equation from Bjørnstad and Jansen (2007, eq.10):
 
After the introduction of the inflation targeting regime, new variables are included to detect 
changes in the new monetary policy. The new variables are the growth in core inflation 
(∆∆𝑝𝑡
𝑗𝑎𝑒
), which is seen as an expectation variable. Since the central bank targets the core 
inflation, a change in this variable may signal a future interest rate change. To ensure that this 
effect only comes into the regression after the regime shift, a step dummy has been included 
to interact with the core inflation. The step dummy: 𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃2001𝑞2 = 1 after the inflation target 
in first quarter of 2001. The step dummy also interacts with changes in the national or euro 
zone interest rate, which captures the short run dynamics. They also included the oil price as a 
new explanatory variable. Insignificant variables are left out. Notice that including a short run 
interest rate dynamic under inflation targeting, renders the change in interest rates 
insignificant on its own, and are thus left out. 
 There is a minor recording error in equation 10
15
. The dummy DUM98 should be symmetric: 
 DUM98= D98Q3 + D98Q4 - D99Q1 - D99Q2.  
Their most relevant result is that the short term effects of the interest rates after the monetary 
policy regime changed sign from the results in Bjørnland and Hungnes (2006), in such a way 
that it better fits the theory. The reason is that a regime shift reverses the direction of the 
causal effect between changes in the nominal exchange rate and interest rates changes. 
                                                 
15
 According to E. Jansen by mail on March 18
th
 2010. 
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“When the central bank targets the exchange rate, interest rates are rarely used and 
only to counteract large movements in the exchange rate when interventions have 
failed. With inflation targeting the interest rate is used to stabilize the domestic 
economy and the exchange rate responds strongly to interest rate changes with the 
expected sign” (Bjørnstad and Jansen (2007,p14)). 
 
In the long run both Bjørnstad and Jansen (2007) and Bjørnland and Hungnes (2006) gets the 
same result, that is, a change of monetary policy regime does not change the long run 
relationship. 
 
4.3 Replication on an Extended Data Set. 
In this section I first replicate the findings of Bjørnstad and Jansen (2007), with the dataset I 
was given by the authors upon request. Although the results are not exactly identical (see 
Table 2), for practical purposes the results are close enough. These minor deviations from the 
original results and test statistics may be due to small data revisions that might have taken 
place after the publication but prior to the construction of the dataset that was available for 
me. A somewhat less likely cause may be differences between the econometric software used: 
I use OxMetrics 6 /PC Give 13, while Bjørnstad and Jansen have been using OxMetrics 4/PC 
Give 11. 
Next, I report how the regression responds to an extended dataset which include first quarter 
of 2008. I will use the beginning of 2008 as the start of the financial crisis, even though the 
most used starting point of the financial crisis was with the official bankruptcy of the Lehman 
Brothers on the 15
th
 September 2008. I do so since investors and governments all around the 
world started anticipating trouble prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which affected the 
expectations and actions to the participants in the foreign exchange market. 
We see that by extending the dataset to include the quarter before the financial crisis the 
equation still works. Also notice that when we include more data from the inflation targeting 
regime, the interest rates dominates the equation even more.  
When we extend the data to include the second quarter of 2009 and the financial crisis, and 
the re-estimate the model, a massive rejection of the specifications occurs, see Table 3. 
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The misspecification tests show that the model no longer fits the data. In addition, there is a 
pronounced drop in the 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅2. Thus, the events happening during the financial crisis 
changes the relationship between the variables. 
The last column is the results from the regression using the equation by Bjørnstad and Jansen 
on data after the inflation targeting regime in 2001. Although the misspecification tests are 
mostly insignificant, we observe that almost none of the variables are significant. Thus, the 
equation is no longer a good representation of the data. Such conclusions could also be drawn 
from Figure 6 1-step forecasts, which is an in-sample one-step-ahead forecast for the relative 
change in the NOK/Euro exchange rate, from the fourth quarter in 2006 until second quarter 
2009. The forecast fails already in its first forecast in the fourth quarter in 2006. The major 
flaws in late 2008 and 2009 are no surprise, as this was the start of the financial crisis.  
The significance of the heteroscedasticity test may be a cause of the increased volatility in the 
exchange rate after the inflation targeting regime and especially during the financial crisis 
seen in Figure 5. It may also be due to an omitted variable that may be significant during the 
financial crisis, since the heteroscedasticity tests also are general misspecification tests. 
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Table 2 OLS regression results
16
 of the Bjørnstad and Jansen model on different sub samples. 
∆𝒗𝒕 Bjørnstad 
and 
Jansen  
replication 1983(1) 
- 
2008(1) 
 1983(1) 
- 
2009(2) 
 2001(2)   
-   
2009(2) 
   
∆𝑝𝑡 − ∆𝑝𝑡
∗ 0.89**   
(0.16) 
0.89**   
(0.16) 
0.92** 
(0.16) 
 1.00** 
(0.23) 
 -0.36 
(0.71) 
   
∆𝑝𝑡−1 − ∆𝑝𝑡−2
∗  -0.47**  
(0.16) 
-0.47** 
(0.17) 
-0.50** 
(0.17) 
 -0.58* 
(0.25) 
 -0.66 
(0.66) 
   
∆2𝑣𝑡−1 -0.24**  
(0.05) 
-0.24** 
(0.05) 
-0.25** 
(0.05) 
 -0.18* 
(0.07) 
 -0.39 
(0.22) 
   
∆4𝑃𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙  -0.024** 
(0.004) 
-0.024** 
(0.004) 
-0.025** 
(0.004) 
 -0.023** 
(0.005) 
 -0.034* 
(0.014) 
   
∆∆𝑝𝑡
𝑗𝑎𝑒 𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃2001𝑔2 -1.70**  
(0.28) 
-1.70** 
(0.28) 
-1.19** 
(0.27) 
 -0.95* 
(0.36) 
 -0.74 
(0.72) 
   
∆3𝑖𝑡𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃2001𝑞2 -9.68**  
(0.99) 
-9.69** 
(1.00) 
-10.07** 
(1.05) 
 -6.48** 
(1.35) 
 -12.02** 
(3.33) 
   
∆3𝑖𝑡−1
∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃2001𝑞2 16.33** 
(1.93) 
16.33** 
(1.93) 
17.74** 
(2.00) 
 10.66** 
(2.32) 
 10.63* 
(4.14) 
   
(𝑣 − 𝑝 + 𝑝∗)𝑡−1 -0.10**  
(0.03) 
-0.11** 
(0.03) 
-0.12** 
(0.03) 
 -0.12** 
(0.05) 
 -0.44** 
(0.13) 
   
[ 𝑖 − ∆𝑝 −  𝑖∗ − ∆𝑝∗ ]𝑡−1 -0.79**  
(0.22) 
-0.79** 
(0.22) 
-0.78** 
(0.22) 
 -0.85** 
(0.31) 
 -0.73 
(0.82) 
   
𝑝𝑡−1
𝑜𝑖𝑙  -0.006* 
(0.0026) 
-0.006* 
(0.0027) 
-0.005 
(0.0026) 
 0.004 
(0.0028) 
 0.055** 
(0.0136) 
   
𝑨𝒅𝒋.𝑹𝟐  0.79 0.75  0.55  0.57    
 
                                                 
16
 * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 
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Figure 5 Volatility in the NOK/Euro exchange rate 
 
Figure 6 1-step forecasts (dashed line) with ±2 standard errors bars from 2006(3) to 2009(2) 
of the Bjørnstad and Jansen model, 95% prediction intervals and outcomes. 
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Table 3 Misspecification tests 
Test 
statistics: 
Bjørnstad and Jansen 
(1983(1)-2006(3)) 
Replication 1983(1)- 2006(3) 1983(1) - 2008(1) 1983(1)- 2009(2) 2001(2)-2009(2)
 17
 
AR 1-5:   
ARCH 1-4:  
Normality :  
Hetero:  
Hetero-X:  
RESET23:  
F(5,74)  = 1.02 [0.41] 
F(4,71)  = 0.33 [0.85]  
Chi^2(2)= 4.33 [0.11] 
F(26,52)= 0.71 [0.83] 
F(5,74)   =  1.0153 [0.4149]   
F(4,87)   =  0.4102 [0.8009]   
Chi^2(2) =  4.3282 [0.1149]   
F(22,68) =  1.0237 [0.4496] 
F(59,31) =  1.1595 [0.3326]   
F(2,77)   =  1.0505 [0.3547] 
F(5,80)   =  0.8765 [0.5008]   
F(4,93)   =  0.2557 [0.9055]   
Chi^2(2) =  2.6186 [0.2700]   
F(22,74)  = 1.0591 [0.4093]   
F(65,31)  = 1.5133 [0.1034]  
F(2,83)    = 1.1277 [0.3287]   
F(5,85)   =   2.7845 [0.0223]*  
F(4,98)   =   6.2003 [0.0002]** 
Chi^2(2) =   59.028 [0.0000]** 
F(22,79)  =   6.2865 [0.0000]** 
F(68,33)  =   31.573 [0.0000]** 
F(2,88)    =   3.4976 [0.0345]* 
F(3,14)   =  0.42463 [0.7384]  
F(3,27)   =   1.8892 [0.1552]   
Chi^2(2)  =   5.3507 [0.0689]   
F(20,10)  =   3.1914 [0.0316]*  
not enough observations 
F(2,15)   =   2.8590 [0.0887]   
Notes: the AR1–5 is a test for autocorrelated errors from lag1 to lag5; ARCH 1–4 is a test for 1- 4th-order autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity in the residuals; the normality test checks whether the residuals are normally distributed;  Hetero test is a test for residual 
heteroscedasticity using squares (Hetero) and squares and cross products (Hetero-X (only calculated if there is a large number of observations 
relative to number of variables in the regression)); and Reset23 test is a regression specification test .(Doornik and Hendry (2009))
18
 
 
                                                 
17
 OxMetrics used AR 1-3 test and ARCH 1-3 test because of fewer degrees of freedom, 
18
 And web page: http://www.pcgive.com/pcgive/batch.html 
 37 
 
4.4 Forecasting Properties: Bjørnstad and Jansen 
versus Random Walk. 
In the spirit of Meese and Rogoff I set an objective to test how well the model by Bjørnstad 
and Jansen performed on out of sample forecasts compared to a simple Random Walk model.  
A simple Random Walk model of the exchange rate is a model, where the level of today’s 
exchange rate is solely determined by yesterday’s exchange rate and an error term, which 
indicates shocks.  
𝑣𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑣𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡  
The α is a constant which makes it possible to start somewhere else than at the origin. Thus, 
the accurate name of this model is a Random Walk model with drift. Notice that the lag of the 
exchange rate has a coefficient which is restricted to one. 
Since the Random Walk model estimates the value of the exchange rate and Bjørnstad and 
Jansen's model explains the rate of change of the exchange rate, the forecasts of the two 
models cannot be compared directly. However, in principle, it is easy to get around this 
problem by re-writing the Bjørnstad and Jansen model with the level of the exchange rate on 
the left hand side of the equation. In practice I make use of an equivalent solution, which 
involves the use of an identity for the level variable 𝑣𝑡 , meaning that the analysis of the 
forecast performance is done in a multi-equation setting. Of course, including the identity 
for 𝑣𝑡  will not change the performance of the model. 
Thereafter, I estimate the system with the First Step Least Square (1SLS) method. The result 
is that the output can be made in the form of levels, like the Random Walk, instead of 
differences. When both equations produce estimates of the levels we can compare them. I 
estimate both models up to the third quarter of 2006, applying the dataset from Bjørnstad and 
Jansen. Subsequently, I forecast both models with 11 periods, which is up to second quarter of 
2009, using 1-Step Ahead forecast method. 1-Step Ahead forecasts project one period ahead 
and then use the results from the forecast for the next period forecast and forward. In 1- Step 
Ahead forecast all other present variables are assumed known. Since Bjørnstad and Jansen’s 
model is the only structural model with other variables, their model benefits from such an 
assumption. The assumption that all the other variables are known in the beginning of each 
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period,  lets the Bjørnstad and Jansen model move in the correct direction even though the 
exchange rate forecast may be wrong. The results from the forecasts are represented in Figure 
7, where the bars represent the forecast standard errors. 
 
Figure 7 1-Step Ahead forecasts comparison with ±2 standard errors bars, Random Walk and 
Bjørnstad and Jansen model. The solid line is the actual value of the exchange rate and 
estimation, while the dashed line is the forecast. 
 
From Figure 7 we see that Bjørnstad and Jansen fail to forecast correctly already in the fourth 
quarter of 2006. Their model also have great forecast failure from second quarter of 2008 and 
onwards. The Random Walk model only fails to forecast the fourth quarter of 2008. This is 
somewhat special, because the Bjørnstad and Jansen model base their forecasts on actual 
realized values of future explanatory variables. 
Instead of representing the forecasts in figures, it is possible to instead calculate the accuracy 
of the forecast. The most popular way to calculate the accuracy, and the way done by Meese 
and Rogoff is with the root Mean Square error (RMSE) method. The RMSE squares the 
values of the forecast errors, next makes an average of the squared forecast errors and then 
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takes the square root of this
19
. In this way it weights the large forecast errors more heavily 
than the smaller ones and over- and underpredictions of the same magnitude has the same 
cost. The method is appropriate when the cost of the error increases as the size of the error 
increases. It is thus sensitive to huge outliers. The RMSE results from the forecasts can be 
found in Table 4. We see that the 1-step-ahead forecast error is smaller in the Random Walk 
model than the Bjørnstad and Jansen model. 
 The financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 could be characterized as a shock to the system which 
could not be foreseen by our variables. In order to examine whether this is the case and to 
investigate whether the models would perform differently without the financial crisis I create 
two forecasts, one up to the financial crisis and one including the financial crisis, see Table 4. 
We can see that the Random Walk still will do better than the Bjørnstad and Jansen model in 
1-Step Ahead forecasting, even though Bjørnstad and Jansen should have a benefit in this 
type of forecasting. 
Table 4 Root Mean Square errors (RMSE), RMSE*100. 
Forecast period 2006(3)-2008(1), 6 quarters 2006(3)-2009 (2), 11 quarters. 
Forecast type 1-Step Ahead Dynamic 1-Step Ahead Dynamic 
Bjørnstad and Jansen 1.9 1.9 3.9 6.1 
Random Walk 1.6 2.1 3.3 4.9 
 
Another, and maybe more relevant in practice, way of forecasting is with dynamic forecasts. 
In 1-Step Ahead forecasts, all other variables than the exchange rate are assumed known. In 
Bjørnstad and Jansen the lag or difference of the exchange rate is included several places. A 
1-step-ahead forecast assumes these values known at actual values, which gives Bjørnstad and 
Jansen a huge benefit compared to Random Walk. In dynamic forecasting all these values are 
affected by the forecasts for each period. The forecast for this period will have feedbacks to 
the lags and differences, which again will affect the next periods forecast, resulting in a 
dynamic process. The results of dynamic forecast of the Random Walk and Bjørnstad and 
                                                 
19
 RMSE = [ 1/H ∑t=1H (yt-ft)2]1/2 ,where the forecast horizon is H, yt the actual values, and ft the forecasts 
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Jansen model are illustrated graphically in Figure 8. The difference in the forecast standard 
error bars is due to the setup of the models. While the Bjørnstad and Jansen forecast errors 
will converge towards a constant, the Random Walk forecast errors will increase as the 
number of forecasts increase, see appendix D. 
We see that the Random Walk model forecasts including third quarter of 2008 are close to 
actual values, while the Bjørnstad and Jansen forecasts only performs well up to first quarter 
of 2008. The model by Bjørnstad and Jansen has a small advantage in dynamic forecasting in 
periods without huge fluctuations in the exchange rate. Neither of the models did foresee the 
impact from the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. Random Walk outperforms the model by 
Bjørnstad and Jansen both with 1-Step Ahead forecasting and with dynamic forecasting when 
forecasting up and through second quarter of 2009. This is most likely a consequence of the 
way the models are constructed (see chapter 5.4).  
 
 
Figure 8 Dynamic forecasts comparison with ±2 standard errors bars, Random Walk and 
Bjørnstad and Jansen model. The solid line is the actual value of the exchange rate and 
estimation, while the dashed line is the forecast. 
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It might be interesting to check whether the difference in 1-step-ahead forecast performance is 
statistical significant.  In order to investigate this matter, I employ the Morgan-Granger-
Newbold (MGN) test (see Clements (2005)). When the forecasts are unbiased the model with 
the best forecasts is the one with the smallest expected squared error. The model with the 
smallest expected forecast errors is the one with the minimum forecast error. It follows that 
the MGN-test tests if the variances of the different forecasts are equal. In accordance to the 
null-hypothesis the two forecasts are equally accurate on average. The assumptions made are 
that the loss of forecasts is squared (like the RMSE) and that the forecast errors have zero 
mean, are normally distributed and serially uncorrelated. 
The test statistics is:  
𝑟
  𝑇 − 1 −1(1− 𝑟2)
~𝑡𝑇−1 
 
where 
𝑟 =
𝒖𝟏
′ 𝒖𝟐
 𝒖𝟏
′ 𝒖𝟏𝒖𝟐
′ 𝒖𝟐
 
The forecast errors are collected in two column vectors e  and e , where 
e =    e  1+h|1,… ,  e  T+h|T 
′
, e = (  e  1+h|1,… ,  e  T+h|T)′ , 𝑢1,𝑡+1|𝑡 =  e  t+1|t − e  t+1|t and  
𝑢2,𝑡+1|𝑡 =  e  t+1|t + e  t+1|t  and T is number of forecasts, (see Clements (2005, p.12)). 
I obtain the value of the test-statistics to be 0.697, which is insignificant under the null 
hypothesis (at both 1% and 5% significance level with the student-t distribution with 10 
degrees of freedom). In other words the forecast difference between Random Walk and 
Bjørnstad and Jansen is not statistical significant, and we cannot differentiate between them in 
forecast performance. 
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5     Exchange Rate Modeling in the 
Period of Inflation Targeting Regime 
Since some of the features and properties of the models made by Bjørnland and Hungnes, and 
Bjørnstad and Jansen may reflect that they use a sample period that includes the pre-inflation 
targeting period, I will make an attempt to model the exchange rate only based on data for the 
period of inflation targeting regime. Among other things, I can then investigate whether a new 
model can “forecast” the exchange rate during the financial crisis better than the existing 
models do. I make use of data from second quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of 2008 in 
the specification of the model. 
 
5.1 From General to Specific 
I start with a general model of the change in the exchange rate (∆𝑣𝑡), with current and lagged 
exogenous variables and lagged endogenous variables as explanatory variables.  
Equation (5.1): 
∆𝑣𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝑣𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝑣𝑡−2 + 𝛾1∆𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝛾2∆𝑝𝑡−2 + 𝛾3∆𝑝𝑡−1
∗ + 𝛾4∆𝑝𝑡−2
∗ + 𝛾5𝑣𝑡−1
+ 𝛾6𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝛾7𝑝𝑡−1
∗ + 𝛾8𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾9𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾10𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝛾11𝑖𝑡−1
∗ + 𝛾12𝑝𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙 + 𝛾13𝑝𝑡−1
𝑜𝑖𝑙
+ 𝜀𝑡  
The endogenous regressors are the lagged difference of the exchange rate. The exogenous 
variables are the first and second lag of the growth in foreign and domestic prices (∆𝑝𝑡 ,∆𝑝𝑡
∗), 
the lagged nominal exchange rate (𝑣𝑡−1), lagged nominal price levels (𝑝𝑡−1, 𝑝𝑡−1
∗ ), and 
current and lagged home and foreign interest rates (𝑖𝑡 , 𝑖𝑡
∗) and oil price (𝑝𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙 ).   
 
5.1.1 Exclusion Restrictions 
To see if the relationship could be modeled as a pure autoregressive model, I compare 
equation (5.1) with a model with only exchange rate dynamics. The model with exchange rate 
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dynamics restricts the coefficients of all the other variables to be equal to zero. In this case 
this amounts to 12 restrictions. As we can see in Table 5, the null hypothesis is rejected at 1 % 
significance value for this sub sample, meaning that there might be improvement in the 
regression by including more variables according to economic theory.  
Next, I test if the relationship can be modeled by an autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) 
model
20
 broadly consistent with an UIP relationship with short run dynamics as exogenous 
variables. I include both contemporary and lagged values of the interest rates. As a proxy for 
the expected depreciation rate, I also include the oil price since it is an important wealth- and 
income determinant for the Norwegian economy. An increase in the oil price will give 
expectations about depreciation in the exchange rate (see chapter 3.6.1 on page 22). 
Thereafter, I put the restriction that all the remaining coefficients are equal to zero. In total the 
mentioned conditions sum up to 6 restrictions. As we can see in Table 5, the model cannot be 
rejected even at 5% significance value, which implies that this relationship can hold according 
to the sub sample. Nevertheless, some individually significant values can of course “hide” 
among the joint zero restriction. Such a possibility motivates more modeling. 
Table 5 Tests of equation (5.1) for exclusion restrictions 
Test for excluding:  
[0] = ∆𝑝𝑡−1 
[1] = ∆𝑝𝑡−2 
[2] = ∆𝑝𝑡−1
∗  
[3] = ∆𝑝𝑡−2
∗  
[4] = 𝑝𝑡−1 
[5] = 𝑝𝑡−1
∗  
[6] = 𝑖𝑡  
[7] = 𝑖𝑡−1  
[8] = 𝑖𝑡
∗ 
[9] = 𝑖𝑡−1
∗  
[10] =𝑝𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙  
[11] =𝑝𝑡−1
𝑜𝑖𝑙  
Subset F(12,13)  =   7.9278 [0.0004]** 
Test for excluding:  
[0] = ∆𝑝𝑡−1 
[1] = ∆𝑝𝑡−2 
[2] = ∆𝑝𝑡−1
∗  
[3] = ∆𝑝𝑡−2
∗  
[4] = 𝑝𝑡−1 
[5] = 𝑝𝑡−1
∗  
 
Subset F(6,13)   =   1.9336 [0.1501]   
 
The same tests were carried out with another equation, where the inflation variable was 
exchnaged with the variable for core inflation (∆𝑝𝑡
𝑗𝑎𝑒
). This new test did not, however, give 
                                                 
20
 ”autoregressive” because lagged values of the dependent variable are included as regressors, and “distributed 
lag” because the regression also includes multiple lags of exogenous variables (Stock and Watson (2007, p 543)) 
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any improvement from the previous starting point. The interest rate decision by the central 
bank is based on the core inflation. Accordingly, the core inflation may be seen as an 
expectation variable for the interest rate. Since I already have included the interest rate, 
including the core inflation might not give any more information about the determination of 
the exchange rate. 
 
5.1.2 Avoiding Multicollinearity 
After estimating equation (5.1) and removing all insignificant values, the lagged interest rate 
does not have the expected sign, see (1) in Table 6. This might be due to high, but not perfect, 
multicollinearity. With time series data a certain degree of collinearity is common, especially 
for variables in levels. The correlation between 𝑖𝑡and 𝑖𝑡−1is 0.96, see the correlation matrix in 
Table 8 in appendix C. To avoid this problem with multicollinearity, we re-specify the model 
with the interest rate in first difference and lagged level. As we see in the correlation matrix 
the correlation between the change
21
 (∆𝑖𝑡) and the lagged value (𝑖𝑡−1) is reduced to -0.21, and 
it is no longer seen as a problem. The reparameterization will not have any impact on the 
accuracy of the model, although it will have small impacts on the coefficients, see (1) and (2) 
in Table 6. As we observe, the standard error of the equation (σ) keeps the same value after 
the reparameterization. 
 
5.1.3 Evidence for UIP and PPP Mechanisms. 
In order to investigate whether there exists any evidence for the hypothesis of an UIP type 
mechanism, I include the interest rate differential in the equation. As noted above, portfolio 
theory says that if the interest rate differential increases, the exchange rate will depreciate. 
Speculators in the exchange rate market reacts fast to changes in the interest rate in effort to 
make profits on arbitrage, and the effects from an interest rate change will thus have an 
immediate effect on the exchange rate. Due to these considerations I choose to include the 
current period UIP condition. As we can see in (3) in Table 6, the interest rate differential has 
                                                 
21
 I will refer to the difference in the interest rate (∆𝑖) as the change or growth in the interest rate, to avoid 
confusion with the interest rate differential (𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡
∗). 
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the expected sign and the standard error of the equation (σ) is unaffected by the 
respecification. Also note that none of the misspecification tests has been significant. 
The lagged values of domestic and foreign prices have so far been without a clear economic 
interpretation, but the statistical tests show that they are relevant explanatory variables. With 
the purpose of aiding interpretation, I include them as a lagged function of the real exchange 
rate. To avoid perfect multicollinearity on the other hand, I have to leave out one of the 
existing explanatory variables. I choose to leave out 𝑝𝑡−1. The result is reported in column (4) 
in Table 6. We see that there exists a real exchange rate relationship. In addition, we can 
notice that this is still only a mere reparameterization, since the standard error of the equation 
is the same.  
If the coefficients of 𝑣𝑡−1and 𝑝𝑡−1
∗ in column (4) had been estimated to zero, we would have a 
perfect real exchange rate relationship. Since this is not the case, the coefficients of 
𝑣𝑡−1and 𝑝𝑡−1
∗ shows how far we are from a perfect real exchange rate relationship. The effect 
we have in (4) might not show a direct exchange market effect, but might be a result of 
capturing a “terms of trade” effect or an effect of extrapolative expectations (𝑒𝑒
′ > 0) in the 
short run. An increase in the lagged exchange rate will with extrapolative expectations give a 
higher appreciation this period (since 𝛽𝑣𝑡−1 > 1). “Terms of trade” is the relative price of a 
country’s exports to imports. An increase in foreign prices will deteriorate our terms of trade, 
since imports gets more expensive relative to exports. This may worsen the current account, 
which may lead to a depreciation of the currency 
22
(see chapter 3.6.1 on page 22). 
                                                 
22
 http://www.norges-bank.no/templates/article____13711.aspx 
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Table 6 OLS results for different specifications on equation (5.1), estimated on period 2001(2) - 2008(2) 
∆𝒗𝒕 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
∆𝑣𝑡−1 -0.49**          
(0.11) 
-0.49**   
(0.11) 
-0.49**   
(0.11) 
-0.49**   
(0.11) 
-0.29*     
(0.13) 
-0.23*     
(0.11) 
 
∆𝑝𝑡−2
∗  1.02*             
(0.42) 
1.02*             
(0.42) 
1.02*        
(0.42) 
1.02*        
(0.42) 
0.70*        
(0.55) 
  
𝑣𝑡−1 -0.42**          
(0.11) 
-0.42**          
(0.11)  
-0.42**          
(0.11) 
1.16**    
(0.40) 
0.19          
(0.41) 
  
𝑝𝑡−1 1.58**            
(0.35) 
1.58**            
(0.35) 
1.58**              
(0.35) 
    
𝑝𝑡−1
∗  -0.79**          
(0.28) 
-0.79**          
(0.28) 
-0.79**          
(0.28) 
0.79**     
(0.20) 
   
(𝑣 − 𝑝 + 𝑝∗)𝑡−1    -1.58**   
(0.35) 
-0.78*      
(0.38) 
-0.61**   
(0.12) 
-0.38**      
(0.13) 
𝑖𝑡  -24.44**       
(2.69) 
      
𝑖𝑡−1 
 
14.60**         
(2.18) 
-9.82**            
(1.85) 
-7.74**            
(1.73) 
-7.74**            
(1.73) 
9.69**     
(2.21) 
9.56**    
(2.10) 
 
∆𝑖𝑡   -24.44**       
(2.69) 
-6.86**            
(2.56) 
-6.86**            
(2.56) 
-5.20*     
(3.36) 
-4.76        
(3.27) 
-11.01**    
(3.44) 
𝑖𝑡
∗ 17.57**                  
(3.44) 
17.57**                  
(3.44) 
    
𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡
∗   -17.57**            
(3.44) 
-17.57**            
(3.44) 
-22.05**  
(4.33) 
-21.60** 
(4.12) 
-3.89*     
(1.70) 
𝑝𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙  -0.057**       
(0.0154) 
-0.057**       
(0.0154) 
-0.057**       
(0.0154) 
-0.057**       
(0.0154) 
-0.018*   
(0.016) 
-0.021* 
(0.011) 
0.015      
(0.0102) 
Equation standard error (σ) 0.0090165 0.0090165 0.0090165 0.0090165 0.011973 0.0118627 0.0160983 
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5.1.4 Econometric Decisions 
The effects of 𝑣𝑡−1and 𝑝𝑡−1
∗  might be influenced by multicollinearity, since both home and 
foreign prices and the exchange rate are mutually correlated. We see in the correlation matrix 
in appendix C that foreign and home prices are highly correlated. Because of this the 
coefficient results may be biased. To check for this I tried to put zero restrictions on 
𝑣𝑡−1and 𝑝𝑡−1
∗  and test for exclusions. If the effect is only caused by multicollinearity, this 
exclusion would not be rejected. Unfortunately, the test gets rejected at 1% significance value, 
meaning that both variables are significant and that not all the explanatory power of the 
variables is caused by multicollinearity. This results in an econometric issue: Shall we include 
the significant values, even though the coefficients cannot be explained by economic theory 
and thus cause confusion, or shall we leave them out which can cause specification error and a 
higher standard error of the equation? 
Even though both 𝑣𝑡−1and 𝑝𝑡−1
∗ are significant, we might still have an element of 
multicollinearity bias. In an effort to exclude the multicollinearity effect, we restrict the 
coefficient of 𝑝𝑡−1
∗ to be equal to zero. We see in (5) that removing 𝑝𝑡−1
∗ from the regression 
renders 𝑣𝑡−1 insignificant and close to zero, giving support to the hypothesis of a 
multicollinearity bias. A drawback of the restriction is that we get an increase in the standard 
error of the equation and a lowering of the significance of the other regressors. Still note, that 
neither of the misspecification tests are significant. 
If we in addition restrict the coefficient of 𝑣𝑡−1to be equal to zero, the standard error of the 
equation is improved, and some of the other regressors become more significant. Also note 
that ∆𝑝𝑡−2
∗  becomes insignificant and is left out of the last modeling (see (6) in Table 6). 
5.1.5 An Unwanted Effect. 
As the observant reader may already have noticed, restricting 𝑝𝑡−1
∗  out of the regression leaves 
the lagged interest rate (𝑖𝑡−1) very significant with the “wrong” sign. When we in addition 
also leave 𝑣𝑡−1 out, the effect of the lagged interest rate renders the change in the interest rate 
(∆𝑖𝑡) insignificant. After investigating whether this effect is a result of the specification of the 
model or a result of the data used, we find no evidence to support that the effect was made by 
a construction error. Yet,  this effect might again be due to correlation between regressors. 
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The lagged interest rate is highly correlated with the home and foreign interest rate 
differential 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡
∗, with a correlation of 0.94714 (see the correlation matrix in Table 8).  
Thus, if we leave it out, we might avoid some of the bias. Because of the short sample period, 
small coincidences may give huge effects and significance, which might be best omitted. 
The result after restricting 𝑖𝑡−1 to be equal to zero is reported in column (7) in Table 6. Further 
on, note that the lagged change in exchange rate ∆𝑣𝑡−1 was reported insignificant and is left 
out. 
In order to check whether the restrictions in (7) in Table 6 can be done, I perform an F-test. I 
employ the model in column (4) as the unrestricted model, which has 10 regressors including 
the constant. Compared to (4), the model in column (7) has three restrictions. The total 
number of observations is 29, while the null hypothesis is that all the restrictions are equal to 
zero (𝛽𝑝𝑡−1∗ = 𝛽𝑣𝑡−1 = 𝛽𝑖𝑡−1 = 0 ). The model gets rejected at 1% significance level, meaning 
that the restrictions can not be done on the data at hand. Another implication is that the 
restricted model is significantly poorer than the unrestricted model in explaining the 
development in the exchange rate. I assume that these results are due to the collinearity issue 
discussed above, and I keep the model in column (7) with its restrictions as my final model. 
The remaining and very important virtue of this model is that none of the misspecification 
tests are significant. This means that we still can make inference about the variables based on 
the t-values and F-statistics. 
As we see in the table, omitting 𝑖𝑡−1 amplifies the standard error of the equation. This 
exclusion also decreases the level of significance on some of the other variables. The effect of 
the home and foreign interest rate differential, which is the cornerstone in the UIP condition 
and important in the portfolio theory, is significantly decreased. The only improved variable 
is the change in domestic interest rate (∆𝑖𝑡), which now includes the effect of the lagged 
interest rate  𝑖𝑡−1 . The change in interest rate has now the strongest effect on the 
development of the exchange rate.  
The final model looks like this (same as column (7) in Table 6): 
Equation (5.2): 
∆𝑣𝑡 = 𝛼 − 0.38(𝑣 − 𝑝 + 𝑝
∗)𝑡−1 − 3.89(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡
∗) − 11.01∆𝑖𝑡 + 0.015𝑝𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙 + 𝜀𝑡  
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5.2 Economic Interpretation. 
Relative to the Bjørnstad and Jansen model, my model has a simpler structure. It is a small 
model, but the virtue is that it only contains theoretical and explainable variables. The model 
has obviously a higher degree of explanation than a Random Walk model, since the restricted 
model gets rejected at 1% significance value during an F-test. 
 
5.2.1 The Power of Interest Rates. 
The home and foreign interest rate differential is a relevant explanatory variable, as the 
portfolio theory and UIP condition states. If the interest rate differential increases by 1 
percentage point (∆ 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡
∗ = 0.01), then the change in the exchange rate will be -3.89%. 
The long run impact of a permanent increase in the interest rate differential with 1 percentage 
point is a permanent appreciation of the NOK/euro exchange rate of 10.2%. Thus, the result is 
in line with the portfolio theory: If the interest rate differential increases, then the NOK/euro 
exchange rate will appreciate. 
What may be on the side of the portfolio theory in my model is the effect of the change in the 
interest rate (∆𝑖𝑡). The content of this effect says that in the short run, domestic interest rate 
changes have a huge effect on the determination of the exchange rate. If both the domestic 
and foreign interest rate increase with one percentage point (∆𝑖𝑡 = ∆𝑖𝑡
∗ = 0.01), in such a way 
that the interest rate differential is unchanged, the exchange rate will appreciate 11.01% in the 
short run. However, this will have no effect in the long run. This result will come in addition 
to the more medium run effect of the change in the interest rate differential, if the interest rate 
differential is not kept constant. In this way, the Norwegian interest rate has more effect on 
the NOK/euro exchange rate, than the European interest rate in the short  run.  
The Norwegian interest rate effect is at odds with the result by Bjørnstad and Jansen, who 
found that an interest rate change in the euro zone has a larger impact on the exchange rate 
than an interest rate increase of equal size in Norway. Such a finding might be caused by the 
samples used. Bjørnstad and Jansen use a sample including both fixed exchange rate regimes 
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and floating exchange rates regimes with a stable exchange rate target. Under these regimes, 
the Norwegian interest rate is dictated by the foreign interest rate. Thus, it is not strange that 
foreign interest rates have a major impact on the exchange rate. Under a floating exchange 
rate regime, the fixed relationship between foreign and home interest rates are removed, 
therefore it might actually be that the Norwegian interest rates has most effect on the 
exchange rate. I found that the long run impact of a permanent decrease in the interest rate 
differential is a depreciation of the NOK/euro exchange rate of 10.2%. Bjørnstad and Jansen 
found the same effect to be equal to 7.9%. The difference might again be due to the sample 
difference.  
 
5.2.2 The Effect of Prices 
I found no evidence that changes in foreign or domestic prices have an immediate impact on 
the exchange rate.  However, in a longer horizon prices have an impact through the real 
exchange rate relationship. The real exchange rate is an equilibrium variable, which acts as an 
error corrector. Changes in the long run real exchange rate relationship will have an impact on 
today’s exchange rate, in such a way that the relationship can be back in an equilibrium. 
According to my model, a 1% change in the real exchange rate will affect the nominal 
exchange rate with -0.38%.  
In my model, I found the oil price not to be significant. The oil price effect on the exchange 
rate has been discussed in numerous studies. Bjørnland and Hungnes (2003) found the oil 
price to be insignificant. In addition, Bjørnstad and Jansen found the oil price to only be 
significant at 5% level, while Akram, in his study “Oil price and exchange rates: Norwegian 
evidence”, found the oil price to have stronger effect if the oil price fell below 15 USD per 
barrel (Bjørnstad and Jansen (2007). In the portfolio theory the oil price is only involved 
through the expectations. What the investors base their expectations on is not necessarily 
constant over time. In my sample (2001(2)-2008(2)) this effect may not have been a 
dominating one. Even though the increase in oil price in the beginning of 2008 was driven by 
expectations alone, the resulting oil price effect can have been dominated by the safe haven 
effect in the determination of exchange rates.  
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The insignificance of the oil price might on the other hand be a result of the strategy of the 
Government Pension Fund. All petroleum revenues are transferred to the fund and invested 
abroad to avoid an overheating in the Norwegian economy and not expose it to the effects of 
oil price fluctuations. The Norwegian economy might be more dependent on the expected 
return on the fund through the spending rule, than on the oil price directly. 
The oil price can also affect the exchange rate through the flow approach. Nonetheless, the 
sub sample of my estimation may have been too short to capture this effect. 
 
5.2.3 Explanation of the Development in the NOK/Euro Exchange 
Rate. 
From May 2000 to January 2003, the NOK appreciated considerably. Many reasons for this 
have been mentioned  in the literature, but the dominating ones are increased interest rates 
relative to other countries, increased oil price, huge surpluses on the current account and the 
Krones status as a safe haven during unrests in the middle-east, (Naug (2003), Bjørnstad and 
Jansen (2007), NOU (2003, no13)).  
 
Figure 9, Data plots of the development of the NOK/euro exchange rate (solid line, left axis), 
the interest rate differential (solid line with dots, right axis) and the change in Norwegian 
interest rate (dashed line, right axis).  
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Applying my model and sample from second quarter of 2001 up to second quarter of 2008, I 
can try to give an explanation of the development in the exchange rate. As we see from Figure 
9, the movements in the NOK/euro exchange rate match the movements in the interest rates 
differential. Up to 2003 the interest rate differential between Norway and Europe increased, 
which resulted in an appreciation in the exchange rate. After a break point in the last quarter 
of 2002, the opposite happened. The interest rate differential decreased until it became zero in 
2004. The exchange rate moved accordingly.  
If the interest rate differential was the only explanatory factor, the exchange rate would be 
almost stable from 2004 up to 2007 and appreciate after. That did not happen. From 2004 to 
2006, the exchange rate appreciated. Several causes operating at more or less the same time 
can explain this appreciation. Steadily increasing interest rate in Norway, but in accord with 
the European interest rate, steadily increasing oil price and big surpluses on the current 
account could have given expectations about a stronger Norwegian currency. These effects 
might have been captured by the change in the interest rate variable (∆𝑖𝑡) in my model, since 
the sub sample might have been to short to discover each effect. 
From 2006 to 2007 the exchange rate depreciated. In the same period the change in the 
Norwegian interest rate was negative, which may explain some of the depreciation. In 
retrospect, some of this depreciation in the exchange rate has been explained by the decrease 
in the oil price and the effect this gave on the expected depreciation rate and thus on the risk 
premium. The decreased risk premium lowered the demand for NOK, and the exchange rate 
depreciated, (Alendal (2010)). The oil price is not significant in my model, so I cannot check 
for this effect. 
From 2007 up to 2008 it again seems like the interest rate differential was the cause of the 
appreciation. 
 
5.3 The Failure in Explaining the Financial Crisis. 
When I increase the sample size to second quarter of 2009 to include the financial crisis, the 
significance of the misspecification tests increase dramatically. Both the normality and 
heteroscedasticity tests become significant at 1% level, in similarity with what happened with 
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the Bjørnstad and Jansen model. This implies that when including the effects that took place 
during the financial crisis, the relationship between the variables breaks down. The error 
terms are then left both with non normal distribution and are heteroscedastic.  Such a collapse 
might be due to an omitted variable. Effects that was not very dominant in the exchange rate 
determination before the financial crisis can have changed to be very dominant during the 
financial crisis. I expect this to be the effect of the expectations and the role of safe havens, 
which is not satisfactory included in the model. 
This can also be shown in the recursive estimates and the Chow test in Figure 11 in appendix 
C. As we see in the Chow test in the bottom panel, a structural break occurs in the end of 
2008. Furthermore, we observe a reaction to the financial crises in the end of 2008 in all the 
other recursive estimates. The events that determined the exchange rate during the financial 
crisis are exceptional circumstances for the time period I look at, which make the relationship 
between the variables to break down. 
 
5.4 Out of Sample Forecasting 
I want to check how the different models perform on forecasts. The models are estimated on 
data from 2001(2) to 2007 (2). I also include the Random Walk model and the model by 
Bjørnstad and Jansen as benchmarks. 
A graphic representation of the different forecasts is given in Figure 10. An important feature 
of model (7) is that it not only estimates but also predicts the exchange rate in all periods to be 
stronger than it actually is. This might be because of the oil price. Although the oil price is 
insignificant, I have kept it in my model for information purposes, but the wrong sign may 
create the bias. On the other hand, it might be caused by the interest rate differential. The 
regression results from 2001 to 2007 might have given the interest rate differential too much 
weight, since the estimation sample from 2001 to 2004 contains a high interest rate 
differential. Further on, we can establish that the model estimate the exchange rate to 
appreciate more than the actual level already from the third quarter of 2006, when the interest 
rate differential started to increase. 
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 If we disregard the level of the exchange rate, the movement of model (7) is quite well. 
Although the model lies well over a quarter behind, the movement in (7) follows the actual 
exchange rate closely. The relationship holds surprisingly well during the financial crisis. 
Unfortunately, because of the under predictions in the level, the error in the fourth quarter of 
2008 is huge. 
When it comes to massive shocks to the system, like the financial crisis, the Random Walk 
model do actually have a great advantage. The true, and so far undiscovered, model of 
exchange rate determination might be huge and complicated. The advantage of the Random 
Walk model is that it includes the “true” model only one period late, see chapter 4.4. 
Econometric models containing equilibrium and error correcting variables will have an ability 
to explain more of the movements. However, models with economic interpretation can be 
more vulnerable for structural breaks. When it comes to forecasting, large shocks can change 
variables in the forecasting period. A Random Walk model will be back on track the next 
period. Economic models will have to lean on its equilibrium relationship and, thus, adjust 
more slowly or maybe not adjust at all. This means that models which may not be very well 
specified, can by luck, do better in forecasts than more correctly specified economic models. 
As we see in Table 7 , there are huge differences between the models on forecasting 
performance considering the RMSE. The Random Walk model is still the best performing 
model on forecasting. Model (7) performs better than Bjørnstad and Jansen on forecasts up to 
the financial crisis. When including the financial crisis in the forecast, the RMSE of model (7) 
increase. I expect this to be a result of the major forecast error in 2008(4). The next step in 
effort to improve exchange rate forecasting might be to make a forecast on a model made on 
an average of either Random Walk and Bjørnstad and Jansen or a model based on all three 
models discussed here. For more discussion about forecast performance of the Bjørnstad and 
Jansen model and the Random Walk model, see chapter 4.4. 
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 Figure 10 1-Step Ahead forecasts from 2007(2)-2009(2) for the model by Bjørnstad and 
Jansen, Random Walk and model (7). 
 
 
Table 7 RMSE from 1-Step Ahead forecasts, when estimating from 2001(2)-2007(2). 
(RMSE*100) 
Forecast period Bjørnstad and 
Jansen 
Random Walk (7)  
𝐑𝐌𝐒𝐄𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟕(𝟑)−𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖(𝟐) 3.09 1.28 2.89 
𝐑𝐌𝐒𝐄𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟕(𝟑)−𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟗(𝟐) 4.07 3.77 5.45 
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6     Conclusion  
The main finding of this thesis is that interest rates are major explanatory variables for 
exchange rates under inflation targeting. In the case of NOK/Euro exchange rate, the interest 
rate differential and a change in the Norwegian interest rate in particular has the biggest 
impact on the exchange rate.  
When it comes to explaining the exchange rate during the financial crisis, my model breaks 
down and shows signs of omitted variables. I attribute this to the role of expectations and 
feeling of security, that safe havens give during unrest in the financial markets. Speculators, 
who ran to big currencies during the financial crisis, had huge impact on the exchange rate of 
currencies that cannot be explained by the fundamentals. 
In forecasting the financial crisis, none of the econometric models could beat a simple 
Random Walk. A model which may not be as good in explaining the exchange rate, can still 
be best on forecasting in periods with great uncertainty. The next step in the forecast 
competition against the Random Walk would be to make a model which contains the level of 
the forecast by Bjørnstad and Jansen, and the movements of model (7). In other words, make 
an average of the Bjørnstad and Jansen model and model (7) and compare against a Random 
Walk model.  
Unfortunately, the inflation target period in Norway has only lasted for 9 years, and two of 
these years contain the financial crisis. A short time span, as the one in question, implies that 
the data sample is very small and do not give an opportunity to extensive testing. More 
observations under “normal times” might have given cleaner results. An interesting thing to 
do when the time comes is to check if models can perform forecast or estimate the new 
equilibrium exchange rate after the financial crisis. 
 57 
 
References  
Alendal, L.A. (2010):”Risikopremien på norske kroner”, Norges Bank staff Memo no.3, 2010 
Bernhardsen, T. and Ø. Røisland, (2000):” Factors that influence the krone exchange rate”, 
Norges Banks Economic Bulletin 4/2000 
Bjørnland, H.C and H. Hungnes (2003):”The importance of interest rates for forecasting the 
exchange rate”, Discussion Papers Statistics Norway No.340 
Bjørnland, H.C and H. Hungnes (2006):”The importance of interest rates for forecasting the 
exchange rate”, Journal of Forecasting vol. 25(3) 
Bjørnstad R and E.S. Jansen (2007): "The NOK/Euro exchange rate after inflation targeting: 
the interest rate rules." Discussion Papers statistics Norway No.501 
 
Clements, M.P (2005): “Evaluating Econometric Forecasts of Economic and Financial 
Variables”, Palgrave Texts in Econometrics. 
Doornik, J.A. and Hendry, D.F (2009):”Empirical Econometric Modeling, PcGive 13” 
volume 1, Timberlake Consultants Ltd. 
 
Frankel, J. and Rose, A. (1995): “Empirical research on nominal exchange rates”, in 
Grossman, G. and Rogoff, K. (eds.) Handbook of International Economics vol. 3,: Elsevier 
Science. 
 
Gjedrem, S. (1999): "Utfordringer i pengepolitikken", Årbok for Stiftelsen for samfunns- og 
næringslivsforskning 1999; ” Økonomisk politikk i en turbulent verdensøkonomi” 
Gjedrem, S. (2009): ”Pengepolitikken ut av finanskrisen”, featured article in Dagens 
Næringsliv 9.10.2009. 
Holden, S. (2006): ”Valuta og valutamarked, forelesningsnotat nr.9” Downloaded 21.2 2010: 
http://folk.uio.no/sholden/E1310/ECON1310-H09-sh.html 
Kennedy, A. (2008): “A Guide to Econometrics” 6th edition, Blackwell publishing. 
Klovland, J. T. (2004): “Chapter 7- Historical Exchange rate data 1819-2003”, Norges Bank 
Occational Papers No.35 “Historical monetary statistics in Norway”. 
Mestad, V. (2002): “Frå fot til feste - Norsk valutarett og valutapolitikk 1873-2001”, Norges 
Banks skriftserie, No.30. 
Naug, B. E. (2003):” Chapter 7- Factors behind the krone exchange rate- an empirical 
analysis”, Norges Banks Occasional Papers (skriftserie) No. 32 “Explaining movements in the 
Norwegian exchange rate” 
 58 
 
Norges Bank (2004): ” Kap. 7 Prisstabilitet”, Norges Banks skriftserie Nr. 34 ”Norske 
finansmarkeder - pengepolitikk og finansiell stabilitet”  
NOU (2003, no.13) Norges offentlige utredning: ”konkurranseevne, lønnsdannelse og 
kronerkurs”. Downloaded 23.2.2010: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fin/dok/NOUer/2003/NOU-2003-13.html?id=118874 
Rime, D and E. Sojli (2006): “Ordrestrømmer av valutakurser” Norges Banks Economic 
Bulletin (Penger og kreditt) no.2, 2006. 
Romstad, M. (2008): ”Ordrestrømsanalyse. Et lyspunkt i valutateorien - teori og praktisk 
anvendelse”, masteroppgave NHH, hentet 22.11.2009: 
bora.nhh.no/bitstream/2330/1896/1/Romstad%202008.pdf 
 Romstad, M. (2009): ”Ordrestrømmer og den svake kronen.” Samfunnsøkonomen no.5, 
2009. 
Rødseth, A. (2000): “Open economy macroeconomics”, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Sarno, L. (2005): “Towards a solution to the Puzzles in exchange rate economics: where do 
we stand? “ The Canadian journal of economics, vol 38. No 3, 2005. 
Stock, J.H. and Watson, M.W. (2007): “Introduction to econometrics” 2nd edition,  
Pearson Education, Inc. 
 
Sørensen, P.B. and Whitta –Jacobsen, H.J. (2005):” Introducing Advanced Macroeconomics: 
Growth & Business Cycles”, McGraw-Hill Education. 
 
Web pages: 
www.norges-bank.no 
www.regjeringen.no 
http://folk.uio.no/sholden 
www.europaveien.no 
www.ssb.no 
www.pcgive.com 
 
 
 59 
 
Register of Tables and Figures 
Figure 1 NOK/Euro exchange rate after 1983 ........................................................................... 7 
Figure 2 Supply and demand in the foreign exchange market ................................................... 8 
Figure 3 supply curves with different capital mobility ............................................................. 16 
Figure 4 the effect over time of a current account surplus. ...................................................... 23 
Figure 5 Volatility in the NOK/Euro exchange rate ................................................................. 35 
Figure 6 1-step forecasts from 2006(3) to 2009(2) of the Bjørnstad and Jansen model,......... 35 
Figure 7 1-step forecasts comparison ,Random Walk and Bjørnstad and Jansen model. ....... 38 
Figure 8 Dynamic forecasts comparison, Random Walk and Bjørnstad and Jansen model. .. 40 
Figure 9 Data plots of the NOK/euro exchange rate, the interest rate differential and the 
change in Norwegian interest rate . ......................................................................................... 51 
Figure 10 1-Step Ahead forecasts from 2007(2)-2009(2) for the model by Bjørnstad and 
Jansen, Random Walk and model (7). ...................................................................................... 55 
Figure 11 Recursive estimates of the coefficients in the exchange rate model (7) ................... 63 
 
Table 1, Net financial assets, by sector ...................................................................................... 9 
Table 2 OLS results of the Bjørnstad and Jansen model on different sub samples. ................ 34 
Table 3 Misspecification tests .................................................................................................. 36 
Table 4 Root Mean Square errors (RMSE), ............................................................................. 39 
Table 5 Tests of equation (5.1) for exclusion restrictions ........................................................ 43 
Table 6 OLS results for different specifications on equation (5.1) …………………………..46 
Table 7 RMSE from 1-Step Ahead forecasts, when estimating from 2001(2)-2007(2). ........... 55 
Table 8:Correlation matrix from PcGive. ................................................................................ 62 
 60 
 
Attachments 
A: Data appendix 
 
Variable definitions 
The original data set (as in Bjørnland and Hungnes (2006) and Bjørnstad and Jansen (2007)) 
 𝑣𝑡= log of the nominal exchange rate between NOK/euro. Before the introduction 
of euro (January 1
st
 1999), theoretical ECU is used. 
𝑝𝑡= log of the domestic price (CPI, Norway). 
𝑝𝑡
∗= log of the foreign price (euro area CPIs). Last quarter (2009q2) is calculated from 
 preliminary numbers from the European central bank ECB) 
𝑖𝑡= domestic interest rate (3 month money market rates, Norway). 
𝑖𝑡
∗= foreign interest rate (3 month money market rates, euro area). 
𝑝𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙= (log of) price of Brent crude oil (USD/barrel). Data including 2007q4 are from Norges 
 Bank data bank. From 2008q1data are from Ecowins corresponding series. The 
 discrepancy between the two series is around 50 cents per barrel of oil in the period |
  they can be compared (in 2008q1 nearly identical)
23
 
𝑝𝑡
𝑗𝑎𝑒
(Log of) consumer price index, net of energy prices and excises (Norway). 
∆=difference operator, i.e. ∆𝑣𝑡 = 𝑣𝑡 − 𝑣𝑡−1 
𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝑝𝑡 =Real interest rates, Norway. 
𝑖𝑡
∗ − ∆𝑝𝑡
∗ =Real interest rates, euro area. 
𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃2001𝑞2 = 0 Up to and including 2001q1 (i.e. exchange rate targeting regime 
𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃2001𝑞2 = 1 After 2001q1 (i.e. inflation targeting regime) 
𝐷𝑥𝑥𝑞𝑦 = 1In 19xx or 20xx, quarter y, and 0 otherwise 
 
  
                                                 
23
 E.Jansen, in mail received 25.1.2010 
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B: The supply curve. 
 
The equations: 
1) 𝑊𝑝 =
𝐵𝑝+𝐸𝐹𝑝
𝑃
 
2) 𝑊∗ =
𝐵∗
𝐸
+𝐹∗
𝑃∗
 
3) 𝑟 = 𝑖 − 𝑖∗ − 𝑒𝑒  
4) 𝑒𝑒 = 𝑒𝑒 𝐸  
5) 
𝐸𝐹𝑃
𝑃
= 𝑓 𝑟,𝑊𝑝  
6) 
𝐹∗
𝑃∗
= 𝑊∗ − 𝑏 𝑟,𝑊∗  
7) 𝐹𝑔 + 𝐹𝑝 + 𝐹∗ = 0 
Set equation 7 into equation 5:  
𝐸(−𝐹∗−𝐹𝑔)
𝑃
= 𝑓 𝑟,𝑊𝑝  
Solve for 𝐹∗:   𝐹∗ =  −
𝑃
𝐸
𝑓 𝑟,𝑊𝑝 − 𝐹𝑔  
Insert into equation 6:    
−
𝑃
𝐸
𝑓 𝑟 ,𝑊𝑝  − 𝐹𝑔
𝑃∗
= 𝑊∗ − 𝑏 𝑟,𝑊∗  
Solve for 𝐹𝑔 :  𝐹𝑔 = −𝑃∗𝑊∗ + 𝑃∗𝑏 𝑟,𝑊∗  −
𝑃
𝐸
𝑓(𝑟,𝑊𝑝) 
Insert equation 1, 2, 3 and 4: 
 𝐹𝑔 = −𝑃∗
𝐵∗
𝐸
+𝐹∗
𝑃∗ ∗
+ 𝑃∗𝑏  𝑖 − 𝑖∗ − 𝑒𝑒 𝐸 ,
𝐵∗
𝐸
+𝐹∗
𝑃∗
 −
𝑃
𝐸
𝑓  𝑖 − 𝑖∗ − 𝑒𝑒 𝐸 ,
𝐵𝑝+𝐸𝐹𝑝
𝑃
  
=−
𝑃
𝐸
𝑓  𝑖 − 𝑖∗ − 𝑒𝑒 𝐸 ,
𝐵𝑝+𝐸𝐹𝑝
𝑃
 − 𝑃∗[
𝐵∗
𝐸
+𝐹∗
𝑃∗
− 𝑏(𝑖 − 𝑖∗ − 𝑒𝑒 𝐸 ,
𝐵∗
𝐸
+𝐹∗
𝑃∗
)]=𝐹𝑠(𝐸, 𝑖 − 𝑖∗ ) 
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 C:  Tables and Figures 
 
Table 8: Correlation matrix from PcGive. 
                               ∆𝑣𝑡          ∆𝑣𝑡−1                    𝛼        ∆𝑝𝑡−2
∗           𝑣𝑡−1 
∆𝑣𝑡                      1.0000        0.044891      0.00000    -0.086505  -0.35012 
∆𝑣𝑡−1                  0.044891   1.0000         0.00000      0.19790      0.34128 
𝛼                         0.00000      0.00000      0.00000      0.00000      0.00000 
∆𝑝𝑡−2
∗                  -0.086505   0.19790       0.00000      1.0000       -0.018306 
𝑣𝑡−1                   -0.35012      0.34128      0.00000     -0.018306    1.0000 
𝑝𝑡−1                     0.16816     0.070693     0.00000     0.016045     0.14390 
𝑝𝑡−1
∗                      0.071956  -0.021787     0.00000     0.045226     0.18183 
𝑖𝑡                          -0.17575   -0.21536       0.00000     0.095412    -0.52812 
𝑖𝑡−1                     -0.020168  -0.12552      0.00000     0.066325    -0.59028 
𝑖𝑡
∗                         -0.21014    -0.15741      0.00000     0.10382      -0.13981 
𝑝𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙                       -0.015985  -0.094402    0.00000     0.048162     0.16902 
∆𝑖𝑡                        -0.57543    -0.32330      0.00000     0.10264       0.27711 
(𝑣 − 𝑝 + 𝑝∗)𝑡−1  -0.35367     0.21399      0.00000     0.020489     0.94074 
𝑖𝑡-𝑖𝑡
∗                     -0.10695     -0.19666      0.00000    0.064785    -0.64357 
 
                                  𝑝𝑡−1             𝑝𝑡−1
∗          𝑖𝑡                  𝑖𝑡−1              𝑖𝑡
∗ 
∆𝑣𝑡                        0.16816       0.071956  -0.17575     -0.020168   -0.21014 
∆𝑣𝑡−1                   0.070693    -0.021787  -0.21536     -0.12552     -0.15741 
𝛼                          0.00000       0.00000      0.00000      0.00000      0.00000 
∆𝑝𝑡−2
∗                     0.016045    0.045226    0.095412    0.066325    0.10382 
𝑣𝑡−1                      0.14390      0.18183     -0.52812     -0.59028     -0.13981 
𝑝𝑡−1                      1.0000        0.97994     -0.30557     -0.42552      0.27563 
𝑝𝑡−1
∗                       0.97994      1.0000       -0.33208     -0.47071      0.26575 
𝑖𝑡                           -0.30557     -0.33208      1.0000        0.96463      0.74943 
𝑖𝑡−1                     -0.42552     -0.47071       0.96463      1.0000        0.60385 
𝑖𝑡
∗                          0.27563      0.26575       0.74943      0.60385      1.0000 
𝑝𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙                        0.94048      0.96628     -0.27433     -0.42986      0.32759 
∆𝑖𝑡                         0.47846      0.55132      0.055047    -0.21011     0.49226 
(𝑣 − 𝑝 + 𝑝∗)𝑡−1   0.39899      0.46873     -0.57203     -0.68107    -0.048550 
𝑖𝑡-𝑖𝑡
∗                     -0.60600     -0.63642      0.90098      0.94714      0.38797 
 
                                   𝑝𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙              ∆𝑖𝑡     (𝑣 − 𝑝 + 𝑝
∗)𝑡−1   𝑖𝑡-𝑖𝑡
∗ 
∆𝑣𝑡                       -0.01598     -0.57543     -0.35367     -0.10695 
∆𝑣𝑡−1                  -0.094402   -0.32330      0.21399     -0.19666 
𝛼                           0.00000      0.00000      0.00000      0.00000 
∆𝑝𝑡−2
∗                     0.048162    0.10264     0.020489     0.064785 
𝑣𝑡−1                      0.16902      0.27711      0.94074     -0.64357 
𝑝𝑡−1                      0.94048      0.47846      0.39899     -0.60600 
𝑝𝑡−1
∗                       0.96628      0.55132      0.46873     -0.63642 
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𝑖𝑡                           -0.27433     0.055047    -0.57203      0.90098 
𝑖𝑡−1                       -0.42986     -0.21011    -0.68107      0.94714 
𝑖𝑡
∗                           0.32759       0.49226    -0.048550    0.38797 
𝑝𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙                         1.0000         0.61074     0.45220     -0.59656 
∆𝑖𝑡                          0.61074       1.0000       0.45816     -0.24594 
(𝑣 − 𝑝 + 𝑝∗)𝑡−1    0.45220      0.45816      1.0000       -0.76450 
𝑖𝑡-𝑖𝑡
∗                      -0.59656     -0.24594     -0.76450     1.0000 
 
 
 
Figure 11 recursive estimates of the coefficients (±2 standard errors) in the exchange rate 
model (7) on the sub sample 2001q2 -2009q2 
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D: variance of forecast errors 
 
Dynamic programming for Random Walk. 
𝑣𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑣𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡  
Forecasts for t+1, t+2, ..., t+N : 
𝑣 𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝑣𝑡  
𝑣 𝑡+2 = 𝛼 + 𝑣 𝑡+1 = 2𝛼 + 𝑣𝑡  
𝑣 𝑡+𝑁 = 𝑁𝛼 + 𝑣𝑡  
True value for t+1, t+2 , ..., t+N : 
 
𝑣𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡+1 
𝑣𝑡+𝑁 = 𝑁𝛼 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡+𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
 
Forecast error: 
𝑣𝑡+𝑁 −  𝑣 𝑡+𝑁 =  𝑢𝑡+𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
 
Variance of forecast error:  
𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑣𝑡+𝑁 −  𝑣 𝑡+𝑁 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟   𝑢𝑡+𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
 = 𝑁𝜎𝑢
2 
The variance of the forecast error (𝑁𝜎𝑢
2) increase as N increase. 
 
Dynamic programming for conditional model (Bjørnstad and Jansen). 
𝑣𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡  
Assume a stable solution: 0<β<1 
Forecasts for t+1, t+2, ..., t+N : 
𝑣 𝑡+1 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑡+1 
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𝑣 𝑡+2 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣 𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝑋𝑡+2 
         =  𝛼 + 𝛽( 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑡+1)+𝛾𝑋𝑡+2 
         = 𝛼 1 + 𝛽 + 𝛽2𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽𝛾𝑋𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝑋𝑡+2 
𝑣 𝑡+𝑁 =  𝛼 𝛽
𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=0
+ 𝛽𝑁𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽
𝑁−1𝛾𝑋𝑡+1 + 𝛽
𝑁−2𝛾𝑋𝑡+2 +⋯ 
True value for t+1, t+2, ..., t+N : 
𝑣𝑡+1 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑡+1 + 𝑢𝑡+1 
𝑣𝑡+2 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝑋𝑡+2 + 𝑢𝑡+2 
             =  𝛼 + 𝛽( 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑡+1 + 𝑢𝑡+1)+𝛾𝑋𝑡+2+ 𝑢𝑡+2 
             = 𝛼 1 + 𝛽 + 𝛽2𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽𝛾𝑋𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝑋𝑡+2 + 𝛽𝑢𝑡+1 + 𝑢𝑡+2 
𝑣𝑡+𝑁 =  𝛼 𝛽
𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=0
+ 𝛽𝑁𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽
𝑁−1𝛾𝑋𝑡+1 + 𝛽
𝑁−2𝛾𝑋𝑡+2 +⋯+ 𝑢𝑡+𝑁 + 𝛽𝑢𝑡+𝑁−1 + 𝛽
2𝑢𝑡+𝑁−2
+⋯ 
 
 
Forecast error: 
𝑣𝑡+𝑁 −  𝑣 𝑡+𝑁 = 𝑢𝑡+𝑁 + 𝛽𝑢𝑡+𝑁−1 + 𝛽
2𝑢𝑡+𝑁−2 +⋯ 
 
Variance of forecast error:  
𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑣𝑡+𝑁 −  𝑣 𝑡+𝑁 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑢𝑡+𝑁 + 𝛽𝑢𝑡+𝑁−1 + 𝛽
2𝑢𝑡+𝑁−2 +⋯  
=
𝜎𝑢
2
1− 𝛽
 
 
The variance of the forecast error converges towards a constant ( 
𝜎𝑢
2
1−𝛽
) as N increase. 
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PcGive output 
Random Walk 
Dynamic (ex ante) forecasts for v (SE based on error variance only) 
 
   Horizon      Forecast         SE        Actual         Error            t-value 
    2006-4       2.08823    0.01856       2.11278     0.0245476     1.322 
    2007-1       2.08949    0.02625       2.10034     0.0108528     0.413 
    2007-2       2.09075    0.03215       2.09246    0.00170333     0.053 
    2007-3       2.09202    0.03712       2.06908    -0.0229363    -0.618 
    2007-4       2.09328    0.04151       2.06383    -0.0294504    -0.710 
    2008-1       2.09454    0.04547       2.07386    -0.0206761    -0.455 
    2008-2       2.09580    0.04911       2.07213    -0.0236764    -0.482 
    2008-3       2.09706    0.05250       2.08696    -0.0101048    -0.192 
    2008-4       2.09833    0.05569       2.18819     0.0898647     1.614 
    2009-1       2.09959    0.05870       2.19134     0.0917540     1.563 
    2009-2       2.10085    0.06156       2.17983     0.0789838     1.283 
   mean(Error) =     0.017351    RMSE =    0.048561 
   SD(Error)   =     0.045355    MAPE =      1.7124 
 
 Bjørnstad and Jansen 
  Dynamic (ex ante) forecasts for v (SE based on error variance only) 
 
   Horizon      Forecast         SE             Actual         Error          t-value 
    2006-4       2.08374   0.008545       2.11278    0.0290364     3.398 
    2007-1       2.09281    0.01019       2.10034     0.00753255   0.739 
    2007-2       2.06450    0.01081       2.09246     0.0279563     2.587 
    2007-3       2.06672    0.01168       2.06908     0.00235547   0.202 
    2007-4       2.05349    0.01242       2.06383     0.0103394     0.832 
    2008-1       2.05213    0.01294       2.07386     0.0217350     1.679 
    2008-2       2.00256    0.01339       2.07213     0.0695652     5.194 
    2008-3       2.00822    0.01379       2.08696     0.0787396     5.711 
    2008-4       2.05283    0.01411       2.18819     0.135363       9.591 
    2009-1       2.14285    0.01439       2.19134     0.0484951     3.370 
    2009-2       2.09267    0.01463       2.17983     0.0871600     5.960 
   mean(Error) =     0.047116    RMSE =    0.061480 
   SD(Error)   =     0.039495    MAPE =      2.2054   
